Removing the Greek from Feta and Adding Korbel to Champagne: The Paradox of Geographical Indications in International Law. by Agdomar, Michelle
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 18 Volume XVIII 
Number 2 Volume XVIII Book 2 Article 6 
2007 
Removing the Greek from Feta and Adding Korbel to Champagne: 
The Paradox of Geographical Indications in International Law. 
Michelle Agdomar 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michelle Agdomar, Removing the Greek from Feta and Adding Korbel to Champagne: The Paradox of 
Geographical Indications in International Law., 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 541 (2007). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol18/iss2/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
AGDOMAR_121907_FINAL 12/19/2007 4:46:53 PM 
 
541 
Removing the Greek from Feta and 
Adding Korbel to Champagne: 
The Paradox of Geographical 
Indications in International Law 
Michelle Agdomar∗ 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................542 
REFLECTIONS................................................................................559 
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE .........................................563 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE SCHISM: A TALE OF  
TWO HISTORIES ......................................................................571 
III. THE CRI DE COUER FOR EXTENSION IS A GUISE FOR 
EUROPEAN TRADE PROTECTIONISM: APHORISM  
OR MYTH? ..............................................................................577 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2587.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
∗ Michelle Agdomar, LL.M., Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, 
cum laude, Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.A. Law Degree (Hons.), 
University of Nottingham.  I would like to thank Professor Susan Scafidi for her 
profound academic guidance and for inspiring the topic of this Note.  I would also like to 
thank Professors Kenneth Plevan and Anthony Dreyer, whose invigorating and scholarly 
trademark classes were invaluable.  I am infinitely grateful to Professor Kenneth Plevan 
for helping to refine and sculpt this Note and to the staff members who edited the Note’s 
final drafts.  A heartfelt thanks to my mother who has supported me 
unflinchingly throughout my intellectual odysseys.  Finally, I would like to thank my 
family, friends, and educators for their priceless support, love and guidance. 
AGDOMAR_121907_FINAL 12/19/2007  4:46:53 PM 
542 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
A. FREE RIDING AND DILUTION: EFFECTS ON  
THE PRODUCER..................................................................580 
B. THE ECONOMICS OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS .............587 
C. SEARCH AND TRANSACTION COSTS: EFFECTS ON  
THE CONSUMER .................................................................589 
D. ANTI-COMPETITIVE? ..........................................................590 
E. A WORTHWHILE EXPENSE? ................................................592 
F. CONFLICT RESOLUTION?....................................................596 
IV. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? ...............................................599 
CONCLUSION.................................................................................606 
INTRODUCTION 
Why is there so much consternation surrounding appellations 
like Champagne,1 Feta cheese,2 and basmati rice?3  Do consumers 
 
 1 “A white sparkling wine from Champagne, a region in Northeast France.” THE 
CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford University Press, Revised 10th ed. 2002) 
[hereinafter CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY].  “Champagne is made by mèthode 
champenoise.  This traditional method requires a second fermentation in the bottle as well 
as some 100 manual operations (some of which are mechanized today).  Champagnes can 
range from pale gold to apricot blush.  Their flavors can range from toasty to yeasty and 
from dry (no sugar added) to sweet.” SHARON TYLER HERBST, THE NEW FOOD LOVER’S 
COMPANION (Barron’s Educational Series, 2d ed. 1995), available at 
http://web.foodnetwork.com/food/web/encyclopedia/termdetail/0,7770,1057,00.html. 
 2 “A white salty Greek cheese made from the milk of ewes or goats.  ORIGIN modern 
Greek pheta.” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1.  The cheese is 
traditionally made with sheep’s milk, or a combination of sheep and goat milk.  Feta 
cheese is curdled with rennet, separated and allowed to drain in a special mold or cloth 
bag.  The cheese is then cut into large slices that are salted and cured in brine solution for 
a week to several months. Feta, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feta (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2007).  Feta cheese is “crumbly and rindless.  It has a rich, tangy flavor, contains 
from 45 to 60 percent milk fat and can range in texture from soft to semidry.” HERBST, 
supra note 1, available at http://web.foodnetwork.com/food/web/encyclopedia/ 
termdetail/0,7770,2446,00.html. 
 3 “A kind of long grain Indian rice with a delicate fragrance.  ORIGIN Hindi fragrant.” 
CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1.  The word basmati means “the 
queen of fragrance,” and it is famous for its fragrance and delicate aroma.  It was first 
discovered in the “foothills of the Himalayas.”  Basmati rice has a “perfumy, nutlike 
flavor and aroma that can be attributed to the fact that the grain is aged to decrease its 
moisture content.” HERBST, supra note 1, available at http://web.foodnetwork.com/ 
food/web/encyclopedia/termdetail/0,7770,280,00.html.  Basmati rice is now mostly 
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need to know that the ham that they are purchasing is really from 
Parma4 or that the porcelain they own is a genuine “émaux de 
Limoges?”5  These questions nestle at the center of one of the 
fiercest debates to take place in the World Trade Organization6 
(“WTO”) in the second decade of its existence.  The heated 
discourse concerns the scope of the geographical indication.  
Specifically, is it necessary to have a globally accepted substantive 
law with respect to the protection of geographical indications?  On 
one side, the United States and its supporters (“New World 
Members”)7  maintain that the current regime provides sufficient 
protection for geographical indications.8  On the other side, the 
 
grown in India and Pakistan. Basmati rice, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Basmati_rice (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 4 “A strongly flavored Italian cured ham, eaten uncooked and thinly sliced.  ORIGIN 
named after the Italian city of Parma.” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra 
note 1.  Parma hams are “seasoned, salt-cured (but not smoked) and air-dried.”  They 
have a rosy brown flesh that is “firm and dense.” HERBST, supra note 1. 
 5 Porcelain boxes are from the Limoges region of France.  Limoges is famous for its 
19th century porcelain. Limoges, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limoges (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 6 The World Trade Organization came into being on January 1, 1995.  It is an 
international organization designed to supervise and liberalize international trade, and is 
the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
 7 Opponents of extension for geographical indications include Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, New Zealand, and the United States. See Council 
for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Joint Proposal for a 
Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications for 
Wines and Spirits, TN/IP/W/9 (Apr. 13, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org (click on 
“Documents”; scroll down and click “Documents Online search facility”; enter document 
number in “Document symbol” box in the “Simple Search”) (listing the countries 
opposing changes to the current legal regime governing international protection of 
geographical indications); see also World Trade Organization, TRIPS: Geographical 
Indications—Background and the Current Situation, Nov. 21, 2005, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm. 
 8 A “joint proposal,” document TN/IP/W/10, has been put forward by the United 
States, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Chinese Taipei. See infra note 
118.  This group does not want to amend the TRIPs Agreement.  Instead it proposes a 
decision by the TRIPs council to set up a voluntary system where notified geographical 
indications would be registered in a database.  Those governments choosing to participate 
in the system would have to consult the database when taking decisions on protection in 
their own countries.  Non-participating members would be “encouraged” but not obliged 
to consult the database. World Trade Organization, TRIPS: Geographical Indications—
Background and the Current Situation, Nov. 21, 2005, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm; infra note 118. 
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European Union and its supporters (“Old World Members”9 or 
“Demandeurs”10) are aggressively pushing for an extension11 of 
the current law.12 
The implementation of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights Agreement13 (“TRIPs”) by the WTO was a landmark event 
for international intellectual property law.  The TRIPs Agreement 
imposes minimum standards upon Member states allowing 
signatories to provide greater protection for intellectual property 
 
 9 Supporters of extension for geographical indications include the European Union, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Thailand, Switzerland, Mauritius, Morocco, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, 
Kenya, Tunisia, Turkey, Madagascar, and India. World Trade Organization, TRIPS: 
Geographical Indications—Background and the Current Situation, Nov. 21, 2005, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm. 
 10 “Lit.  a.  asker, applicant; (Law) Plaintiff.” CASSELL’S FRENCH ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
105 (Wiley Publ’g 2002).  The term is used by the World Trade Organization to refer to 
states who request things of other states.  In this Note Demandeurs is the cumulative term 
used to identify countries who are demanding extension of the current international 
geographical indication framework.  Throughout this Note the term Demandeurs will be 
used interchangeably with the term “Old World Members.” 
 11 In this Note the term “extension” refers to amending TRIPs in accordance with the 
proposal set forth in the E.U. proposal document TN/IP/W/11. See infra note 12 for a 
synopsis of the E.U. proposal.  The term “extension” will be used interchangeably with 
the term “enhancement.” 
 12 The E.U. proposal, document TN/IP/W/11, circulated in June 2005, calls for the 
TRIPs Agreement to be amended (by adding an annex to article 23.4).  The paper 
proposes that when a geographical indication is registered, this would establish a 
“rebutable presumption” that the term is to be protected in other WTO members—except 
in a country that has lodged a reservation within a specified period of time (for example 
18 months).  A reservation would have to be on permitted grounds.  These include when 
a term has become generic or when it does not fit the definition of a geographical 
indication.  If it does not make a reservation, a country would not be able to refuse 
protection on these grounds after the term has been registered.  Hong Kong, China has 
proposed a compromise document (TN/IP/W/8).  Here a registered term would enjoy a 
more limited “presumption” than under the E.U. proposal, and only in those countries 
choosing to participate in the system. World Trade Organization, TRIPS: Geographical 
Indications—Background and the Current Situation, Nov. 21, 2005, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm. Documents TN/IP/W/11 and TN/IP/W/8 
are available at http://www.wto.org (click on “Documents”; scroll down and click 
“Documents Online search facility”; enter document number in “Document symbol” box 
in the “Simple Search”); see also supra note 8. 
 13 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M 81(1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPs]. 
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rights if they so choose.14  The Agreement not only laid the 
foundation for an increase in global intellectual property 
protection, it simultaneously married intellectual property rights 
with free trade.15  The most familiar intellectual property rights 
protected by TRIPs are copyrights, trademarks, and patents.16  
Importantly, TRIPs also included the geographical indication as a 
form of intellectual property.  “Geographical indications are, for 
the purposes of this agreement, indications which identify a good 
as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality 
in that territory, where a given quality, reputation, or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin.”17  Hereinafter, goods covered by this article 
will be referred to as cultural goods/products.  An example is 
basmati rice, which is renowned for its aromatic fragrance, slender 
grain, and which is traditionally grown in India or Pakistan.18  In 
Europe, basmati rice has geographical indication protection 
ensuring that only rice that is produced in India and Pakistan with 
 
 14 See id. art. 1. 
 15 See World Trade Organization, TRIPS: Preamble, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2007) (“Members, Desiring to 
reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the 
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to 
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not 
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade[.]”). Id. paras. a–e (embodying the 
Member states recognition of the need for rules and disciplines to achieve the goals of 
TRIPs as set forth in the preamble).  In particular paragraph c recognizes the need for 
“the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related 
intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in national legal systems[.]” 
Id. para. c.; see also World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The 
Agreements—Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2007) (stating that 
“the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), 1986–1994, Uruguay Round, introduced intellectual property rights into the 
multilateral trading system for the first time”). 
 16 Throughout this Note the term “intellectual property” shall be used to cover 
copyrights, trademark, and patents collectively.  The author acknowledges that 
intellectual property includes trade secrets and some other branches of the law.  However, 
those branches of the law are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 17 TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 22.1. 
 18 See supra note 3. 
AGDOMAR_121907_FINAL 12/19/2007  4:46:53 PM 
546 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
these identifying characteristics can be labeled basmati rice.19  In 
stark contrast, basmati rice does not receive geographical 
indication protection in the United States.20  This means that in the 
United States any manufacturer or producer of rice can use the 
appellation basmati to label its rice.21  The result is that the current 
TRIPs regime permits inconsistent22 and discriminatory 
geographical indication protection among the WTO Member 
states.23 
The case of basmati rice reveals that under the current 
international geographical indication regime important obligatory 
TRIPs mandates are not being met, as the law is far from uniform, 
thereby preventing equal market access.24  The case of basmati rice 
 
 19 Council Regulation 510/2006, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 93) 13.  This regulation protects 
geographical indications of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs.  The 
Regulation repeals and replaces (EEC) No. 2081/92; see infra note 122. 
 20 See U.S. Patent No. 5,663,484 (filed July 8, 1994) (issued Sept. 2, 1997); see also 
Farhana Yamin, Intellectual Property Rights, Biotechnology, and Food Security 53, 63 
(Institute of Development Studies, Working Paper No. 203, 2003),  available at 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/wp/wp203.pdf (stating that “Texas based Rice-Tec 
Inc., granted a patent on basmati rice lines and grains developed using Indian basmati rice 
and marketed under the ‘basmati’ name”); see also Letter from Donald S. Clark, 
Secretary, FTC, to Charlotte Arnold Christin, Esq., Joseph Mendelson, III, Esq., Andrew 
Kimbrell, Esq., (May 9, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/riceletter.pdf 
(responding to a letter challenging the advertising of U.S. grown rice as “basmati” or 
“jasmine,” where the FTC represent that basmati rice is “aromatic, rough rice” which is 
not limited to the rice grown in any one region).  The FTC also represented that there was 
no evidence to suggest that U.S. grown rice is being represented as rice from other parts 
of the world. 
 21 For example, Lundberg produces basmati rice that is made in the United States.  
More information about this manufacturer is available at http://www.lundberg.com. 
 22 See infra notes 220–221. 
 23 The current system is discriminatory because there is a two-tiered system of 
protection for geographical indications, one for wines and spirits and a weaker level of 
protection for other goods.  The result is that countries with well known geographical 
indications such as basmati, have failed to secure “additional protection” under the 
TRIPS Agreement.  Instead they are obliged to provide a higher level of protection for 
wines and spirits even while these very same indications are deemed “generic” or “semi-
generic” in key markets such as the United States and Canada. Dwijen Rangnekar, The 
Pros and Cons of  Stronger Geographical Indication Protection, School of Public Policy, 
6 BRIDGES, March/April 2002, at 3, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES6-
3.pdf. 
 24 One the main goals of TRIPs was to set into place uniform and fair international 
intellectual property laws for all WTO Members, with the twin goal of  attempting to 
reduce distortions and impediments to international trade. See TRIPs preamble, supra 
AGDOMAR_121907_FINAL 12/19/2007  4:46:53 PM 
2008] THE PARADOX OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 547 
is also the quintessential case reflecting the consequences of failure 
to implement a globally accepted substantive law with respect to 
the protection of geographical indications.25  Developing countries 
are forced to compete unfairly against wealthier developed nations 
whose agricultural products are often highly subsidized.26  
 
note 15.  Basmati rice is an important source of income for Indian rice farmers and the 
current international geographical indication regime forces them to compete unfairly 
against more developed countries such as the United States.  Enhancing the current 
international geographical indication regime would permit basmati rice farmers to enjoy 
the full economic benefits of the goodwill that has developed in their product. See 
generally Jolayemi Adewumi, Trade & Environment Database Case Studies, Who Owns 
It?: US-India Basmati Rice Dispute In WTO (1998), available at 
http://www.american.edu/TED/basmati.htm.  India imports 45,000 tonnes of rice to the 
U.S. and this forms 10 percent of total basmati exports.  The value of the basmati rice 
exports to the U.S. is approximately $250 million dollars per annum. Rice is the 
cornerstone of food and culture in many countries, including India in Southeast Asia. See 
also DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND COOPERATION, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, 
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 2004 RICE PRODUCTION (2005), http://agricoop.nic.in/ 
Statatglance2004/SecAdvEstFood.htm (estimating that in 2004–05 India produced 73.29 
tonnes of rice). See Felix Addor et al., Swiss Federal Institute, Geographical Indications: 
Important Issues for Industrialized and Developing Countries, THE IPTS REPORT (May 
2003), http://www.jrc.es/home/report/english/articles/vol74/ITP1E746.htm (stating that 
“regrettably the protection of GIs at the international level is far from being adequate.  
Except in the case of wines and spirits, it is all too easy to misuse GIs.  The case of 
basmati rice is perhaps the best illustration” (citing Watal (2001)). 
 25 See Kunal Bose, Commodities & Agriculture: India Sets up Rice Export Zone, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at 28. 
 26 The United States current ceiling for trade subsidies to its farmers is currently $17 
billion per annum.  Last year the United States only spent $11 billion dollars despite its 
cap of $22 billion. See Global Trade Talks: Potsdam’s Price, ECONOMIST, June 30, 2007 
at 16 [hereinafter Potsdam]; see also Pedro Echeverria, Letters to the Editor: Better 
Protection for Geographical Indications, FIN. TIMES, July 5, 2004, at 10 (stating that 
extension of the current geographical indication regime is necessary for producers all 
over the world so that they can benefit from the globalization of trade: “Concretely, this 
means allowing basmati rice producers in India, Pakistan and Nepal to reap the fruits of 
the economic and social benefits of Basmati rice production.  But today, on the contrary, 
they are constantly defending themselves against the abuse of the name of their product 
by American producers and others who are riding piggy back on the name and goodwill 
of basmati.”); see also, Eoin Callan, US Accuses Doha Dissidents, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fb1a834c-5cda-11dc-9cc9-0000779fd2ac.html (discuss-
ing the obstacles to progress in the Doha round of negotiations: “The US is keen to push 
on with negotiations on the basis of draft agreements advanced by the World Trade 
Organization to open markets to farm and manufactured goods.  But some WTO 
members argue that the proposed cuts that poorer nations are asked to make in industrial 
tariffs are far bigger than the concessions being asked of richer countries on agricultural 
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Developing countries do not have the budgetary means to 
subsidize their farmers to protect them from cheaper imports or the 
costs of more expensive exports.27  As has happened with basmati 
rice in the United States,28 products are mass produced and 
marketed absent their traditional or characteristic traits.  
Consequently, the poorer producers of genuine basmati rice are 
neither able to fully enjoy the benefits of the goodwill developed in 
their product, nor are they being given genuine opportunity to 
participate in enhanced market access.29  Additionally, the 
consumer is misled as to the true quality and characteristics of the 
goods that are for sale. 
The current situation is problematic for a plethora of reasons.  
First, one of the main goals of TRIPs was to set into place uniform 
and fair international intellectual property laws for all WTO 
Member states.30  Second, when TRIPs was signed in 1994, the 
WTO Member states made a commitment to make positive efforts 
designed to ensure that developing countries,31 and especially the 
 
products, thus undermining the aim of the Doha round to focus on farming as the issue of 
most concern to developing countries”). 
 27 See US Accuses Doha Dissidents, supra note 26. 
 28 This Note is concerned with the United States and its response to geographical 
indication enhancement.  Accordingly, the discussion is primarily focused around the 
United States.  This in no way suggests that other WTO Member States are free from 
criticism. 
 29 See Echeverria, supra note 26 (Echeverria is a “producer of Antigua coffee from 
Guatemala and [is] President of Origin (organisation for an international geographical 
indications network, Brussels, Belgium”)). 
 30 See, e.g., TRIPs, supra note 13; TRIPs preamble, supra note 15; see also The World 
Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, paras. 2, 3, 13, 
15, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 [hereinafter DMD], available at http://www.wto.org.  The 
Declaration builds upon work already undertaken in the WTO Agriculture Agreement.  
Negotiations concerning agriculture began in early 2000 under Article 20 of the WTO 
Agriculture Agreement.  By November 2001, and the Doha Ministerial Conference, 121 
governments had submitted a large number of negotiating proposals.  The Declaration 
confirms and sets a timetable for the mandates developed by the Ministers to be 
implemented. 
 31 “TRIPS allows developing countries to phase in intellectual property rights over a 
period of time and ultimately attempts to create a uniform standard of protection [for 
right holders from Member States,] without regard to the level of development or 
economic policies of a specific country.” Muria Kruger, Harmonizing TRIPS and the 
CBD: A Proposal from India, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 169, 170, 207 n.7 (citing INT’L 
INTELL. PROP. L. 278–79 (Anthony D’Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds. 1997) 
(referencing Jerome H. Reichman)). The TRIPS Component of the GATTS Uruguay 
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least developed among them, secure enhanced market access and 
secure a share in the growth of world trade.32  Third, TRIPs applies 
to all nations that are party to the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs [hereinafter GATT].33  Consequently, 
[d]eveloping countries, as members of the GATT, 
were forced to comply with the TRIPs Agreement 
because all members of the GATT must comply 
with its agreements.  Developing countries cannot 
afford to sacrifice GATT membership in protest of a 
specific treaty because they need to belong to the 
 
Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World 
Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 212–13 (1993) (stating that 
“some industries in developing countries will be displaced temporarily while the country 
is getting its intellectual property protection up to TRIPS standards”). 
 32 See DMD, supra note 30, para. 2. 
 33 The table of contents of WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2000) is a daunting list of about 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and 
understandings.  The Agreements fall into a simple structure within six main parts: an 
umbrella agreement, (The Agreement Establishing the WTO); agreements for each of the 
three broad areas of trade that the WTO covers (goods, services and intellectual 
property); dispute settlement; and reviews of government’ trade policies.  The GATT 
Agreement falls under the umbrella Agreement Establishing the WTO, accordingly any 
members of the GATT Agreement at the time the Agreement Establishing the WTO was 
signed became members of the WTO. See World Trade Organization, Legal Texts: The 
WTO Agreement, A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2007) 
(relevant portions under the headings “Introduction” and “Agreement Establishing the 
WTO”); see also World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, Overview: A 
Navigational Guide, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2007) (under the heading “Six-part broad outline”).  Members of 
the WTO are bound by the terms of the TRIPS Agreement.  See also World Trade 
Organization, GATT and the Goods Council, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
gatt_e/gatt_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2007) (explaining the function of the GATT).  The 
Agreement existed to break down barriers in international trade and has now been 
replaced by the World Trade Organization. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A 
GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 37 (2d ed. 2007) (“The Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement or TRIPS) is one of a number 
of Agreements that comprise the Final Act of the 1994 Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT.  This celebrated round of negotiations, 
which involved the majority of the trading nations of the world, commenced in 1986 and 
concluded in 1994.  The Final Act created the World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
oversee its provisions.”). 
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GATT to reap the benefits of treaties which favor 
their countries.34 
Moreover, in the case of geographical indications, the Council 
for TRIPs Ministerial Conference is required to keep under review 
the application of the provisions of TRIPs Article 24, which 
requires Member states to enter into continued negotiations aimed 
at increasing protection for individual geographical indications.35  
Finally, one of the goals of geographical indication protection is to 
prevent consumer confusion caused by deceptive trade practices,36 
which is akin to one of the goals of American trademark 
protection.37  Failure to adequately protect any form of intellectual 
property should be anathema to any true laissez faire economy and 
tends to support arguments for enhanced protection. 
A. Background: Past Negotiations 
Despite geographical indication protection being placed on the 
TRIPs agenda since its inception, by the time of the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in 2001,38 there was still no 
 
 34 Kruger, supra note 31, at 182–83; see also Andrew Charlton & Joseph Stiglitz, The 
Doha Round is Missing the Point on Helping Poor Countries, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2005, 
at 19 (discussing the inequality of bargaining powers between developing countries and 
the superpowers). 
 35 See TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 24 (requiring the Council for TRIPs to keep under 
review the application of the provisions in TRIPs art. 23 which address geographical 
indication protection for wines and spirits).  The WTO Ministerial Conference is required 
to meet at least every two years and is the organization’s top most decision making body, 
see World Trade Organization, WTO News—2001 News Items, Mexico offers to host 
next Ministerial Conference, Nov. 30, 2001,  http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
news01_e/mexico_min_conf_e.htm. 
 36 See TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 22.2(a) (Article 22(a) protection applies to all 
products, other than wines and spirits, and protects them against all uses that are 
misleading to the public). 
 37 JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 47 (3d ed. 2001); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §1(a) 
(2) (stating in pertinent part that, “One who causes harm to the commercial relations of 
another by engaging in a business or trade is not subject to liability to the other for such 
harm unless: (a) the harm results from acts or practices of the actor actionable by the 
other under the rules of the Restatement relating to: . . . (2) infringement of trademarks 
and other indicia of identification . . . .”). 
 38 World Trade Organization, The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm (last visited Nov. 
24, 2007). 
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agreement between the WTO Member states concerning the scope 
of geographical indication protection.  The Doha negotiations 
resulted in the creation of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
(“DMD”),39 an agreement in which the WTO Member states 
renewed their commitment to the implementation of the current 
WTO multilateral trade agreements.40  Thus, in signing the DMD 
the United States renewed its commitment to the goals of TRIPs 
and ipso facto entered into negotiations aimed at increasing 
protection for individual geographical indications under Article 
23.41  The DMD also recognized “the particular vulnerability of the 
least-developed countries and the special structural difficulties they 
face in the global economy.”42  Moreover, the DMD memorialized 
the WTO Member States’ new agreement: a) to negotiate the 
establishment of a multilateral system of notification and 
registration of geographical indications for wines and spirits,43 and 
b) to negotiate issues relating to the protection of geographical 
indications provided for products other than wines and spirits.44  
Additionally, the European Union requested the claw back of 
forty-one geographical indications that have become generic 
worldwide.45  This would ensure that those products receive 
geographical indication protection under any new regime.  
 
 39 The Doha Ministerial Declaration was adopted on November 14, 2001. See generally 
DMD, supra notes 30 and 32. 
 40 See generally DMD, supra notes 30 and 32 and TRIPs, supra note 13. 
 41 See TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 24.1 (stating that “Members agree to enter into 
negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of individual geographical indications 
under Article 23”).  Article 23 addresses geographical indication protection for wines and 
spirits. See id. art. 23. 
 42 DMD, supra note 30, para. 3. 
 43 See TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 23.1 (“Each Member shall provide the legal means for 
interested parties to prevent use of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines 
not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in question or 
identifying spirits for spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical 
indication in question, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the 
geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as 
‘kind,’ ‘type,’ ‘style,’ ‘imitation,’ or the like.”). 
 44 See TN/IP/W/11, supra note 12; see also supra note 11. 
 45 For an exhaustive list of the forty-one goods, see Bruce A. Babcock & Roxanne 
Clemens, Geographical Indications and Property Rights: Protecting Value-Added 
Agricultural Products, MATRIC Briefing Paper 04-MBP 7 (2004), at 4, available at 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/04mbp7.pdf (citing European 
Commission data from 1994). 
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Importantly, the DMD also set a timeline for completing these 
mandates.46  The Ministers established a two track approach.  First, 
there were those issues, such as wines and spirits, for which there 
was an agreed negotiating mandate in the declaration.47  It was 
agreed that the progress of these negotiations would be monitored 
at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in 2003,48 with the ultimate 
goal of completing the negotiations no later than January 2005.49  
Second, there would be those implementation issues where there 
was no mandate to negotiate, but would be taken up as a matter of 
priority by the relevant WTO councils and committees.50  These 
negotiations concerned products other than wines and spirits and 
the deadline set for completion of the negotiations was 2002.51  
However, by the time of the Fifth Ministerial conference in 2003, 
neither the negotiations concerning the establishment of a 
multilateral register for wines and spirits was complete nor had the 
WTO councils and committees met to report on the status of the 
negotiations for goods other than wines and spirits.52 
 
 46 See DMD, supra note 30, paras. 12, 46 (setting forth a timetable that the WTO 
Member States should follow to place the issue of the implementation of geographical 
indication protection before the WTO trade negotiations committee). 
 47 See DMD, supra note 30, art. 12 (stating that “where we provide a specific 
negotiating mandate in this Declaration, the relevant implementation issues shall be 
addressed under that mandate”); see also, DMD supra note 30, art. 18 (stating that 
Member States “agree to negotiate the establishment of a multilateral system of 
notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and spirits by the Fifth 
Session of the Ministerial Conference”). 
 48 The Fifth Ministerial Conference was held in Cancun, Mexico in 2003. World Trade 
Organization, The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2007); see also DMD, 
supra note 30, art. 45 (stating that “[t]he Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference will 
take stock of progress in the negotiations, provide any necessary political guidance, and 
take decisions as necessary”). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. arts. 12, 46 (providing that these bodies were to report on their progress to the 
trade negotiations in 2002 for “appropriate action”). 
 51 See id. art. 12. 
 52 See World Trade Organization, Doha Development Agenda: Negotiations, 
Implementation, and Development, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ 
dda_e.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2007) for a more in depth discussion concerning the 
timeline for the negotiations in accordance with the Doha Declaration. 
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The divergence was such that by the Sixth Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong,53 in the 2005 round of negotiations, the 
best the parties could do was to agree to disagree and unofficially 
move the deadline forward to the end of 2006.54  The latest Doha 
setback was a failed Ministerial summit in Potsdam in June 2007.55  
The ministers “failed once again to narrow their differences” 
concerning the scope of the international geographical indication in 
what has become an interminable round of negotiations.”56  The 
Potsdam Ministerial Conference was a meeting expected to narrow 
differences but instead it widened them.57  While previous summits 
broke down over agriculture,58 this time the new fear of China was 
the prevalent issue.59  “As a result, a new excuse to fail to agree 
was found.”60 
It is notable that in other areas of international intellectual 
property law, protection for right holders has increased largely at 
 
 53 The Sixth Ministerial Conference was held in Hong Kong, China in 2005. World 
Trade Organization, The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/min05_e.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2007). 
 54 See TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 24 (stating that Members agree to continued 
negotiation of geographical indication legislation); see also INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR 
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES 1, 19–23 (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/dohabriefings/Doha_Hong_Kong_Update.pdf [hereinafter 
ICTSD DOHA UPDATE]. 
 55 See Potsdam, supra note 26, at 16.  For more detailed information concerning the 
Potsdam summit visit http://www.wto.org. 
 56 Trade Talks: Mangling Trade, ECONOMIST, June 30, 2007, at 86 [hereinafter 
Mangling Trade]. 
 57 See Potsdam, supra note 26, at 16. 
 58 Mangling Trade, supra note 56. 
 59 See id. (noting that manufacturing rivals of China, such as Brazil and Argentina have 
complained about the goods that China has allegedly “dumped on the markets,” 
destroying industries). 
 60 Id.; see also Potsdam, supra note 26 (discussing the Brazilian trade minister, Celso 
Amorim, leaving the Potsdam trade talks early as he was disappointed by the offer the 
United States made concerning agricultural subsidies.  In return he offered “vacuous” 
cuts in industrial tariffs.  The Indian trade minister, Kamal Nath, also left the Potsdam 
trade talks disgruntled); see also Alan Beattie & Eoin Callan, US Accuses Doha 
Dissidents, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at 12 (quoting Christine Lagarde, the French 
economic minister stating that “she did not expect a global trade deal in the foreseeable 
future because the divisions among the WTO Members remained ‘too wide’”). 
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the behest of the United States61 and the European Union.62  In 
signing the TRIPs Agreement the United States committed itself to 
all of the TRIPs mandates including the long term objectives of 
correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in the 
marketplace.63  As one of the main proponents of TRIPs, instead of 
impeding extension of the existing geographical indication regime, 
the United States should view extension as an opportunity to show 
its genuine commitment to greater comity in the multilateral 
trading system.64  Thirteen years after TRIPs was ratified two 
questions linger: 1) Why have the WTO Member states failed to 
reach an agreement concerning the scope of international 
geographical indication protection?  2) More specifically, why has 
the United States adopted an uncharacteristic posture in opposing 
heightened protection for geographical indications?65 
B. The Debate 
“At the heart of the debate are a number of key issues: When a 
geographical indication is registered in the system, what legal 
effect, if any, would that need to have within member countries, if 
the multilateral register is to serve the purpose of facilitating 
 
 61 In the United States this phenomenon is evidenced by the implementation of treaties 
such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  The Treaty increases protection for 
copyright holders well beyond that required for TRIPs compliance.  Furthermore the 
United States and the European Union have extensive bi-lateral treaty programs that link 
heightened intellectual property to trade concessions. 
 62 See FARHANA YAMIN, FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT, GLOBALISATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF MODERN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, IPR’S, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND FOOD SECURITY 44, 
http://www.gapresearch.org/governance/FYIPRsfinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) 
(discussing bilateral investment treaties concluded by the EU and the U.S., including 
explicit requirements to allow patenting of plants and animals and provision for 
enforcement of IPRs at the “highest international standards”). 
 63 See DMD, supra note 30, art. 13. 
 64 See Doris Estelle Long, “Democratizing” Globalization: Practicing the Policies of 
Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 224 (2002) (noting that there 
has been a history of economic, political and cultural imperialism that has led to a power 
imbalance). 
 65 See “joint proposal,” document TN/IP/W/10 from the U.S. proposing a voluntary 
system where notified geographical indications would be registered in a database, 
available at http://www.wto.org (search engine “legal documents”); see also supra note 
8; infra note 118. 
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protection?”66  Would the financial and administrative costs for 
individual governments outweigh the benefits of implementation 
of enhanced protection?67  What would be the effect, if any, of 
countries who opted not to participate in the system?68  To date, 
these questions remain unanswered and the timeline for completing 
the negotiations is unclear. 
Consequently, attempting to define the scope of geographical 
indication protection in the international intellectual property 
arena69 has caused a huge schism between traditional allies and 
united former opponents.70  The European Union maintains that 
extension of the current regime will particularly benefit developing 
countries.71  Interestingly, many developing countries do not 
support the European Union’s push for extension.72  In fact, many 
WTO Member states have adopted unconventional positions in this 
hotly contested and salient debate creating unusual bed-fellows.73  
The result is that there are developing countries supporting both 
the European Union arguments for extension and the United States 
arguments against extension. 
 
 66 World Trade Organization, TRIPS: Geographical Indications—Background and the 
Current Situation, Nov. 21, 2005, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ 
gi_background_e.htm. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Originally, geographical indications were protected in accordance with national laws 
developed locally.  As the law was national it was limited in effect to the state territory.  
It quickly became apparent, once commerce expanded in the 19th century, that national 
protection was not sufficient as products were imitated outside of their country of origin, 
World Intellectual Property Organization, International Symposium on Geographical 
Indications. International Symposium on Geographical Indications, Beijing, June 26–28 
2007, at 4, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/geoind/en/wipo_geo_bei_07/ 
wipo_geo_bei_07_www_81780.doc [hereinafter Beijing Symposium]. 
 70 Typically the United States and the European Union have similar agricultural 
agendas and face challenges to their agricultural policies from developing countries.  In 
the geographical indication debate the United States and the European Union are deeply 
divided. See, e.g., Rangnekar, supra note 23, at 2 (pointing out “that the current GI debate 
cuts across the traditional North South divide on IPRs and is equally reflective of a divide 
between the ‘new world’ and the ‘old world’”). 
 71 See TN/IP/W/11, supra note 12, at 2. 
 72 See World Trade Organization, TRIPS: Geographical Indications—Background and 
the Current Situation, Nov. 21, 2005, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ 
gi_background_e.htm (listing countries opposed to extension). 
 73 See supra, notes 7–9 (listing countries for and against extension of the current 
geographical indication regime). 
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C. A Step in the Right Direction 
Despite continued uncertainty concerning the scope of 
geographical indication protection, there are indications that 
greater comity is possible.  In December 2006, the Congress of the 
United States approved legislation implementing a United States 
Wine Agreement bill (“Wine Agreement”) with the European 
Union.74  The Wine Agreement prohibits the use of seventeen 
semi-generic wine names including Chablis75 and Champagne on 
new United States labels while grandfathering such use for existing 
trademarked labels.  This means that henceforth, an American 
wine producer will be prohibited from using a new trademark with 
the name Champagne in the United States market.  This change to 
the law passed virtually unnoticed by many.  However, the 
amendment to the bill is a small step in the right direction towards 
compliance with TRIPs and the DMD.  More importantly, the 
practical effect of the bill is to provide the equivalent of 
geographical indication protection to these seventeen semi-generic 
wines that it was enacted to protect.  It is also a significant sign 
that greater uniformity and equality is a real possibility within the 
current gargantuan multilateral trading system.  However, this bill 
does not concern cultural goods other than wines.  Thus, there is 
still a lacuna concerning adequate geographical indication 
protection for other cultural products.  Moreover, TRIPs Articles 
24.1(1) and 24.2(2) mandate that negotiations concerning 
increasing protection for extension of geographical indications 
must be continued by all of the WTO member states.76 
Against this backdrop, the debate concerning extension of the 
current international geographical indication regime continues to 
 
 74 26 U.S.C.A. § 5388 (2006); see also Congress Approves Wine Agreement Bill With 
Exceptions, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sec. 50, Dec. 15, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 
21817650. 
 75 “A dry, white burgundy wine from Chablis in eastern France.” CONCISE OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1.  The wine belongs to the Chardonnay family of 
wines considered to be more acidic and less fruity than other Chardonnays.  The 
appellation Chablis was created in 1944. See Chablis, Wikipedia, 
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/chablis (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 76 TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 24.1.  TRIPS Article 24 states: “Members agree to enter 
into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of individual geographical indications 
under Article 23.” See also id. arts. 23.4, 24.2. 
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rage.  To date there is still no consensus between the European 
Union and the United States concerning the European Union’s 
proposal for the establishment of a multilateral register, and 
extension of geographical indication protection to goods other than 
wines and spirits.  Neither is there any agreement concerning the 
claw back of geographical indications that have become generic 
worldwide. 
D. Dissecting the Debate and Moving Forwards 
This Note will examine some of the reasons for the divide 
between historical allies.  The answer is partially nestled in the fact 
that this debate is as much about free and transparent trade77 as it is 
about cultural preservation.  While the impregnable link between 
trade and intellectual property rights has unquestionably been 
forged,78 there is a legal vacuum concerning the scope, if any, of 
the possible link between intellectual property rights and culture.  
Therein rests the paradox of the international geographical 
indication: What exactly is the nexus between trade and culture?  
Are international intellectual property laws the appropriate 
mechanism to safeguard culture?  As the whirlwind of 
globalization intensifies, countries are melded into a homogenous 
commercial network, ensuring that the debate surrounding the 
regulation of the relationship between culture and trade is set to 
intensify.  The phenomena of globalization and harmonization with 
the resultant byproduct of homogenization are certainly not new 
concepts.  Rather, the crux of the matter is the reaction to extension 
of geographical indication protection as it is indicative of a larger 
problem concerning adequate international protection for right 
holders.  Without effective and fair participation of all WTO 
Member states, harmonization of intellectual property laws will 
transmogrify into a tool of oppression rather than progression.79 
 
 77 See Addor et al., supra note 24 (discussing the way that extension of the current 
geographical indication regime supports transparency). 
 78 This is exemplified by the TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13. 
 79 Vandana Shiva, Director of the Research Foundation for Science and Ecology in 
New Delhi, India views the TRIPs Agreement “as a continuation of over 500 years of 
colonialism of developing countries.” Kruger, supra note 31, at 171 (citing VANDANA 
SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE, 11–16 (1997)).  Vandana 
Shiva argues that developed countries create “intellectual property protection laws that 
AGDOMAR_121907_FINAL 12/19/2007  4:46:53 PM 
558 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
Part One of this Note sets forth the current law concerning 
geographical indications in accordance with TRIPs obligations and 
critiques the current law.  Part Two examines reasons for the 
schism between the United States and the European Union 
concerning enhanced protection for geographical indications.  Part 
Three takes a close look at the arguments for and against enhanced 
protection for geographical indications.  The chapter explores the 
similarities between the goals of the United States trademark 
system and those of enhanced geographical indication protection.  
Part Four considers whether this debate is otiose or if the 
international community can actually derive tangible benefits from 
enhanced protection of geographical indications. 
In conclusion, three arguments are presented.  First, intellectual 
property is an item of global trade.80  Accordingly, right holders of 
cultural products must have a predictable level of protection for 
their goods as failure to do so distorts the flow of trade and 
undermines the benefits flowing from the TRIPs Agreement.81  
Enhanced geographical indication protection is a means to achieve 
this goal by ensuring mutual reciprocity in the level of protection 
between Member States.82  Moreover, in light of the similarities 
 
drain wealth and resources from third world countries and transfer it back to developed 
countries.” See id. at n.11; see also Martin Wolf, Trade Talks Need a Little Intelligent 
Discrimination, FIN. TIMES, July 14, 2004, at 19; Long, supra note 64, at 256 (arguing 
that even the appearance of coercion should be avoided if harmonization is to achieve the 
goals of transparency and accord with the critical development of effective universal 
standards). 
 80 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 33, at 37 (“The TRIPs Agreement is premised on the 
position, advanced primarily by the U.S. , that intellectual property protection is a  trade 
issue.  According to this view, in a global economy increasingly characterized by trade in 
information goods, the failure to protect intellectual property rights distorts the flow of 
trade and undermines the welfare benefits flowing from the GATT system.”). 
 81 See id.  The preamble of the TRIPs Agreement clearly reflects that one of the 
overarching goals of TRIPs is “to reduce distortions and impediments to international 
trade . . . taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of 
intellectual property rights . . . . ” TRIPs preamble, supra note 15; see also YAMIN, supra 
note 62, at 5 (pointing out that “harmonized standards of IPRs have been agreed at a 
global level chiefly through TRIPS. . .[but] that for low income countries, the costs of 
strengthening IPRs may well outweigh the gains.  Moreover the gains that might accrue 
through increased technological inflows resulting from stronger IPRs are likely to be 
realized over the long term, while the costs will accrue immediately”). 
 82 See Beijing Symposium, supra note 69, at 4. 
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between the goals of the American trademark, certification mark83 
and collective mark,84 the United States should not impede efforts 
to develop a globally accepted substantive law with respect to 
geographical indications.  In fact, the United States must consider 
extension of the existing geographical indication regime as the 
logical next step in the bid for heightened global protection of 
intellectual property rights in this increasingly borderless trading 
arena.  Second, it is imperative that WTO members from 
developing countries view enhanced protection for geographical 
indications positively and play an active role in defining its 
boundaries in furtherance of endogenous development in their 
countries.  Third, as one of the main proponents of TRIPs, the 
United States’ continued failure to reach a meaningful consensus 
concerning the scope of geographical indications calls into 
question the legitimacy of TRIPs and its twin goals of reducing 
distortions and impediments in international trade while taking into 
account the need to adequately protect intellectual property 
rights.85 
REFLECTIONS 
This debate is distinct from the typical debate concerning 
intellectual property rights as the source of the product is not an 
individual or an entity.  The myopic focus on the sole author or 
inventor in traditional intellectual property law fails to protect 
 
 83 “The term ‘certification mark’ means any word, name, symbol, device or any 
combination thereof— (1) used by a person other than its owner, or (2) which its owner 
has a bona fide intention to permit a person other than the owner to use in commerce and 
files an application to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to 
certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy or other 
characteristics of such person’s goods or services or that the work or labor on the goods 
or services was performed by members of a union or other organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 
1127 (2005). 
 84 “The term ‘collective mark’ means a trademark or service mark— (1) used by the 
members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization, or (2) 
which such cooperative, association or other collective group or organization has a bona 
fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register 
established by this chapter, and includes marks indicating membership in a union, an 
association or other organization.” Id. 
 85 See TRIPs preamble, supra note 15. 
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property that is co-owned.86  A unique feature of the geographical 
indication is that the producer or manufacturer of the product is a 
collective, a group that has some unifying inherent characteristic, 
trait or quality that it is trying to protect.87  This can be referred to 
as the cultural component.  It must be conceded, ab initio, that 
there is an inherent difficulty in defining culture in a world in 
which its very definition is constantly evolving.  This is evidenced 
by the fact that renowned international organizations such as the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(“UNESCO”)88 have struggled to find an adequate definition.89  
However, it is this cultural component that makes the topic of 
geographical indications unique—it is a tale about the struggle of 
the preservation of culture. 
An example of the failure to recognize the bond between trade 
and culture can be found in the Neem90 tree saga:91 
 
 86 See SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN 
AMERICAN LAW 20 (Rutgers University Press 2005). 
 87 See Shalini Bhutani & Ashish Kothari, The Biodiversity Rights of Developing 
Nations: A Perspective From India, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 587, 602 (2002) 
(discussing how alien the concept of community control of resources is to the Western 
concept of property); see also SCAFIDI, supra note 86 (addressing the issue of co-
ownership of intellectual property). 
 88 A specialized agency of the United Nations established in 1945, formed to contribute 
to peace and security by promoting international collaboration through education, science 
and culture. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, About 
UNESCO, http://www.UNESCO.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2007) (under the heading, 
“About UNESCO”). 
 89 At the 1998 Stockholm Conference on Cultural Policies for Development a Plan of 
Action was adopted recommending, inter alia, the design and establishment of cultural 
policies in such a way that they become one of the key components of endogenous and 
sustainable development.  The definition and scope of culture has been an ongoing 
negotiation until ratification of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 2005. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON 
CULTURAL POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT, ACTION PLAN ON CULTURAL POLICIES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT (1998), http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/stockholm/html_eng/ 
actionpl1.shtml. 
 90 “A tropical Old World tree which yields mahogany like wood, oil, medicinal 
products and insecticide. [Azadadirachacta indica.]  ORIGIN C19: via Hindi from 
Sanskrit nimba.” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1. 
 91 The Neem tree literally means “[t]he free tree of India.”  “Traditionally known as the 
‘village pharmacy’ the Neem tree’s pesticidal and medicinal properties have been known 
and used for centuries in India.”  Medically, it is an effective analgesic and it is also 
effective in controlling diabetes.  The main active ingredient of Neem exhibits 
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The Neem tree, native to India, is used by the Indian 
people for a myriad of medicinal purposes. The 
bark has a compound which can be used to clean 
teeth, and the leaves and seeds have compounds 
which demonstrate anti-fungal, anti-septic, and anti-
viral characteristics.  Oils from the seeds have 
contraceptive properties, and the leaves and seeds 
also contain natural pesticides. . . .  W.R. Grace, an 
agricultural chemical company based in Boca 
Raton, Florida, stabilized azadirachtin in water and 
patented both the stabilization process and the 
stabilized form of azadirachtin with the United 
States Patent Office.  W.R. Grace never applied for 
a patent in India as India did not grant patents for 
agricultural products at that time.  Shortly after the 
US patent was granted, a coalition of 200 different 
organizations and 35 states petitioned the United 
States Patent Office to invalidate the patent, calling 
it an act of ‘intellectual and biological piracy.’92 
The dispute arose because it was the knowledge of the people 
of India that alerted the [American] company of the tree’s 
scientific uses.93  Without their knowledge, the tree would have 
been an ordinary tree to W.R. Grace.94  The effect of the patent 
was that India, despite ownership of the Neem tree, had no legal 
right to use and develop the tree for medicinal or creative 
purposes.95  After six years of legally challenging the United 
States’ acquisition of azadirachtin, India won a major victory when 
the Opposition Division of the European Patent Office revoked the 
patent granted to the United States Department of Agriculture and 
 
antifeedant insect repellant and insect sterilization properties.  The oil from the tree is 
used as an organic fertilizer. Plasma Neem, The Power of Neem, 
http://www.plasmaneem.com/about.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 92 Kruger, supra note 31, at 173–74. 
 93 Id. at 174. 
 94 Id. at 174. 
 95 See Frederick Nzwili, Multinationals Lose Exclusive Rights Over Neem Tree, AFRICA 
NEWS, May 22, 2000. 
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W.R. Grace for a fungicide derived from the Neem tree.96  “The 
Research Foundation and its partners in the Neem patent 
challenges felt confident in the case, since the Neem patents were 
‘a clear case of piracy of indigenous people.’”97  While this case 
was a victory for India, absent adequate protection for cultural 
products, cases like this will arise again.98  Right holders of 
cultural products should not have to fight to protect their goods on 
a case-by-case basis, but rather through an integrated approach.99  
International geographical indication protection has the potential to 
protect against such acts of biopiracy.100  Thus, it immediately 
becomes easier to understand how the geographical indication, for 
many, morphs into a cultural guardian.  It is the cultural 
component of the geographical indication that gives birth to 
notions of authenticity, quality, belonging and attribution.  In this 
Note the term “culture” includes traditional knowledge, skills, 
processes and ingredients101 used to produce or manufacture a 
product.102  The discomfort with the usurpation of a geographical 
indication is partially embedded in the concept that such an act 
constitutes theft of culture.  Deciding who owns culture is a 
Herculean and, at times, uncomfortable task. 
 
 96 See id. (including protestors Vandana Shiva, head of Research Foundation for 
Science, Technology and Ecology (RFSTE); The International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movement (IFOAM); Magda Alvoet, Environmental Minister of Belgium 
and a former Green Member of the European Parliament). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Adewumi, supra note 24.  In an earlier case the U.S. government had granted a 
patent to two Indian-born scientists on the use of “Turmeric” as a wound-healing agent.  
Scientists from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research challenged the patent 
on the ground that the healing properties of Turmeric had been “common knowledge” in 
India for centuries and was thus not a new invention. 
 99 Kruger, supra note 31, at 175. 
 100 “‘Biopiracy’ n. derogatory bioprospecting, regarded as a form of exploitation for 
developing countries.” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 136. 
 101 For example the aboriginal didgeridoo must be made with authentic aboriginal 
designs and special materials in order for the instrument to be considered authentic.  See 
also infra note 284. 
 102 Most of the products discussed in this Note are foodstuffs but many other cultural 
products are protected as geographical indications.  For example, Ordinance on the Use 
of the Designation “Swiss” for Watches of December 23, 1971 as last amended on March 
29, 1995 (Status as at July 1, 1995), available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/fiche.jsp? 
uid=ch099 (the Swiss legislation is officially published in Recueil Officiel 1971.1915, 
RO 1995.1218); see also Beijing Symposium, supra note 69, at 4. 
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Geographical indications gnaw at the Achilles heel of 
international legislation governing intellectual property rights—the 
inability to avoid protectionism and to legislate to protect the 
multiple and varying interests of all WTO member countries fairly. 
 
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
The concept of a geographical indication is not a novel one.  
Geographical indications were protected as far back as the Roman 
Empire.  “Early evidence in the 12th century of the use of 
[indications of geographic origin] and seals of quality exist in the 
form of indications of city-origin by tapestry manufacturers from 
central Europe and clothiers in England.”103  Geographical 
indications were first formally protected in the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883).104  Additionally, 
two earlier WIPO-based treaties enshrined similar concepts.  The 
Madrid Agreement (1891)105 recognized “indications of source” 
and the Lisbon Agreement (1958)106 recognized “appellations of 
origin.”  Critics of these agreements alleged that “the separation of 
‘indications of source’ and ‘appellations of origin’ was a false 
dichotomy and that a narrow focus on denominations that were 
 
 103 DWIJEN RANGNEKAR, ISSUE PAPER NO. 4, UNCTAD, ICTSD PROJECT ON IPR’S AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, A REVIEW OF PROPOSALS AT THE TRIPS COUNCIL: 
EXTENDING ARTICLE 23 TO PRODUCTS OTHER THAN WINES AND SPIRITS 11, (2003), 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/CS_rangnekar.pdf [hereinafter ICTSD 
project]. 
 104 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last 
revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at 
http://www.wipo.org.  The Convention is one of the first international intellectual 
property treaties.  It is currently administered by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization and has 171 contracting member countries. Id. 
 105 Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on 
Goods, Apr. 14, 1891, revised Oct. 31, 1958, 828 U.N.T.S. 389.  The agreement is 
currently administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization. Id. 
 106 Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their 
International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, as last revised Jan. 1, 1994, 923 U.N.T.S. 205, 
available at http://www.wipo.org.  This Agreement is administered by the International 
Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization. Id. 
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‘direct geographical names’ was biased against other 
denominations.”107 
The signature of TRIPs enhanced the international regulatory 
framework for geographical indications.  For the first time, there 
was consensus amongst the WTO members on a definition for 
geographical indications and an international dispute settlement 
mechanism.108  Consequently, the current definition is broader than 
its predecessors.  Article 22.1 describes geographical indications 
as: “Indications which identify a good as originating in the territory 
of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given 
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin.”109  This definition is broad 
enough to cover indications that derive their name directly from a 
geographic region such as Champagne and indications that are not 
direct geographic names such as basmati rice.  The definition also 
encapsulates reputation exceeding the narrower definition in the 
Lisbon Agreement that was restricted to “quality and 
characteristics.”  While the TRIPs definition for a geographical 
indication is much broader, it mandates a two-tiered model of 
regulation.  All products are covered by Article 22, which defines a 
standard level of protection.  Article 22.2(a) mandates that 
geographical indications have to be protected in order to avoid 
misleading the public.110  Article 22.2(b) is aimed at protecting the 
interests of producers against acts of unfair competition.111  Article 
23 provides a higher or enhanced level of protection for 
geographical indications for wines and spirits, subject to a number 
 
 107 Rangnekar, supra note 23, at 1. 
 108 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 
2007).  The WTO Dispute Settlement Body is the mechanism used to handle disputes 
between World Trade Organization Member States.  The DSB establishes panels to hear 
disputes and issues rulings and recommendations.  Failure to comply with the DSB’s 
ruling may lead to suspension of concessions or other trade privileges by the aggrieved 
Member State. Id. 
 109 TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 22.1. 
 110 Id. art. 22.2(a). 
 111 Id. art. 22.2(b). 
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of exceptions.112  These goods have to be protected even if misuse 
would not cause the public to be misled.  It is this two-tiered model 
of regulation that the European Union and its supporters are 
seeking to amend. 
Article 22.2, which delineates the basic protection afforded to 
all products except wines and spirits, reads as follows: 
In respect of geographical indications, Members 
shall provide the legal means for interested parties 
to prevent: 
(a) the use of any means in the designation or 
presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that 
the good in question originates in a geographical 
area other than the true place of origin in a manner 
which misleads the public as to the geographical 
origin of the good; 
(b) any use which constitutes an act of unfair 
competition within the meaning of article 10bis of 
the Paris Convention (1967).113 
In order to prevent the incorrect use of a geographical 
indication under this section the party that considers itself wronged 
must furnish proof that the wrongful use of the geographical 
indication is misleading for the public or constitutes unfair 
competition.  This results in different protection for the same 
geographical indication in different countries.  In stark contrast, 
Article 23.1 simply prohibits the incorrect use of geographical 
indications and additionally prohibits the use of a corrective.114  
The practical result is that Article 23.1 sets forth a higher level of 
protection for wines and spirits.  Article 23.1 reads as follows: 
Each Member shall provide the legal means for 
interested parties to prevent use of the geographical 
 
 112 Id. art. 24, paras. 3–9.  This section lists the circumstances under which a Member 
State is not required to enforce the TRIPs provisions concerning geographical indications. 
Id. 
 113 Id. art. 22.2. 
 114 Id. art. 23.1.  A corrective would be the addition of a word such as “like,” “style” or 
“imitation” before the geographical indication to indicate that the product is not authentic 
(e.g., American style basmati rice). See id. 
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indication identifying wines for wines not 
originating in the place indicated by the 
geographical indication in question, even where the 
true origin of the goods is indicated or the 
geographical indication is used in translation or 
accompanied by expressions such as “kind,” “type,” 
“style,” “imitation” or the like.115 
Accordingly, it is a violation of Article 23.1 to label a wine: 
“Bordeaux wine produced in Hong Kong.”  The protection is 
automatic and objective.  To make the distinction clear, as the law 
currently stands under article 22, designations such as Rocquefort 
cheese, produced in Norway or Hereke carpets, made in the U.S.A. 
are currently permissible absent a showing of consumer deception 
or unfair competition.116  It is this two-tiered level of protection 
that New World Members propose should be replaced.  Instead, it 
is proposed that there would be one level of automatic and 
objective protection, identical to the protection afforded wines and 
sprits, for all geographical indications.117 
The European Union’s bid for heightened protection has 
primarily emerged on two platforms.  The first platform is that of 
international negotiation.  At the Doha round of negotiations in 
2005, two topics were placed on the negotiating table.  The first 
topic concerned the establishment of a multilateral register for 
wines and spirits.  The second topic concerned heightened 
protection for goods other than wines and spirits.118  The European 
 
 115 Id. art. 23.1. 
 116 See Addor et al., supra note 24. 
 117 See E.U. proposal, supra note 12; see also TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 23; supra note 
114 and accompanying text. 
 118 See Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Geographical Indications: 
Communication from the European Communities, TN/IP/W/11 (June 14, 2005) (detailing 
the European Union’s proposal for extension), available at http://www.wto.org (search 
engine “legal documents”); Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, 
Proposed Draft TRIPS Council Decision on the Establishment of a Multilateral System of 
Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits, 
TN/IP/W/10 (Apr. 1, 2005) (detailing a joint proposal for limited extension by the New 
World Members), available at http://www.wto.org (search engine “legal documents”); 
Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Multilateral System of Notification 
and Registration of Geographical Indications Under Article 23.4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, TN/IP/W/8 (Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org (search engine 
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Union presented three proposals to support its goal of heightened 
protection for geographical indications: 1) The establishment of a 
multilateral register of geographical indications119; 2) The 
extension of the protection for wines and spirits to other products; 
and 3) The claw-back of certain European geographical indications 
whose names have become generic worldwide.120 
The second platform is that of international litigation.  The 
United States and Australia requested that a WTO dispute 
settlement panel be established to hear their claims against the 
European Union concerning its discriminatory treatment of foreign 
right holders.121  The case challenged a 1992 European Union 
system under which more than 600 European products were 
registered for protection to ensure “quality.”122  The challenge 
involved the registering in Europe of foreign agricultural products 
with regional names like Idaho potatoes.123  The United States 
 
“legal documents”) (detailing a proposal presented by Hong Kong, China, containing a 
compromise between the demands of Old World Members and the New World 
Members). 
 119 Specifically Members would establish a multilateral system of notification and 
registration, consisting of a searchable database of all GIs for wines and spirits. 
Currently, national offices do not have any single place to look for information about 
which items are recognized in other countries as GIs. Joint Proposal For A Multilateral 
System Of Notifications And Registration of Geographical Indications For Wines And 
Spirits, TN/IP/W/9, at 2–3, available at http://www.wto.org (click on “Documents”; run 
search in “Official documents”; click on simple search and enter document number in the 
“Document symbol” box). 
 120 Currently the European Union has cleared a short list of forty-one regional products.  
Examples include Roquefort cheese and Beaujolais wine. See supra note 45. 
 121 See Panel Report, Complaint by the United States, European Communities—
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org (click on 
“Documents”; scroll down and click “Documents Online search facility”; enter document 
number in “Document symbol” box in the “Simple Search”); Panel Report, Complaint by 
Australia, Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS290/R (Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org 
(click on “Documents”; scroll down and click “Documents Online search facility”; enter 
document number in “Document symbol” box in the “Simple Search”). 
 122 Council Regulation 2081/92, Protection of Geographical Indications and 
Designations of Origin of Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1 
(EC), available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/gr/gr022en.html (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2007). 
 123 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATION 
PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/ 
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charged that the EU Regulation124 discriminated against United 
States geographical indications and trademarks on two grounds: 1) 
discrimination against United States geographical indications in 
violation of the TRIPs mandate concerning national treatment;125  
and 2) failure to protect United States trademarks.126  With respect 
to national treatment, “the United States was concerned that the 
Regulation imposed significant barriers to registration and 
protection” for non-European persons and non-European 
products.127  For example, the Regulation permitted “producers of 
Parma ham in Italy” to restrain others from using the name of 
Parma or comparable names within the European market.128  
However, the Regulation would not permit United States 
“producers to do the same with respect to their products.”129  Thus, 
the United States argued that the Regulation was not TRIPs 
compliant with respect to the protection of intellectual property 
 
globalip/pdf/gi_system.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2007) (explaining the protections the 
U.S. affords to geographical indications).  Idaho potatoes are potatoes that are grown in 
Idaho that receive protection under the United States certification mark regime. Id. 
 124 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States Wins 
“Food Name” Case in WTO Against EU (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/ 
Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/March/United_States_Wins_Food_Name_Case
_in_WTO_Against_EU.html [hereinafter USTR Press Release]; see also Council 
Regulation 2081/92, supra note 122. 
 125 See TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 3.1 (addressing the national treatment principle as 
applicable to the TRIPs Agreement).  Article 3 states that “[e]ach Member shall accord to 
the nationals of other Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own 
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property, subject to the exceptions 
already provided. . .” TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13, Part I, General Provisions and 
Basic Principles.  In the case of TRIPs this means that Member States must provide equal 
treatment to the relevant intellectual property right belonging to a national of another  
Member State. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13, Part I, General Provisions and Basic 
Principles, article 1, 3.  The panel found that the application procedures under the 
Regulation requiring non-E.C. nationals to file an application in the European 
Communities through their own government (but not directly with E.C. member states) 
for GI registration located in their own countries, provided for less favorable treatment to 
other nationals in violation of Article 3(1). See CLEARY GOTTLIEB EC TRADE REPORT, 
PANEL REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF TRADEMARKS AND GEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS FOR 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND FOODSTUFFS 4 (Jan.–Mar. 2005), http://www.cgsh.com/ 
files/tbl_s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5C486%5CCGSH_CGSH_Trade_Report_1Q_0
5.pdf [hereinafter CLEARY REPORT] (detailing the findings of the Panel). 
 126 USTR Press Release, supra note 124. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
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rights for non-European Union nationals and with respect to 
GATT130 and treatment of non-European goods.131  Second, “the 
United States was concerned that the . . . Regulation would” 
prevent trademark owners from enforcing their trademarks.132  
This is because a trademark owner “would not be able to stop the 
confusing uses of similar [geographical indications], which is one 
of their rights under the WTO TRIPS Agreement.”133  The precise 
cause for concern “was the use of linguistic variations of 
[geographical indications], where those linguistic variations are 
confusingly similar to European trademarks of the [United States] 
companies and are used to market the European [geographical 
indication] product, causing consumer confusion.”134  The WTO 
panel agreed with the United States, and determined that this 
would present concerns under the TRIPs Agreement.135  
Accordingly, the panel concluded that the geographical indication 
Regulation could only protect geographical indications as 
registered and not linguistic variations of the geographical 
indication.136  This is an important principle for [United States] 
trademark owners.137  This means, for example, that companies 
such as Anheuser-Busch, which owns valid trademarks for 
“Budweiser” and “Bud” in Europe, can stop confusing uses of 
translations or linguistic variations of [geographical indications].138  
While the WTO panel determined that significant components of 
the Regulation were TRIPs incompatible,139 it determined that 
 
 130 Id. at 2; see also EC Trademarks and Geographical Indications, (DS174,290), 
Summary Of Key Panel Findings, available at http://www.wto.org (search term 
“DS174,290”) (“The Regulation was also found inconsistent with GATT Art. III:4.”); 
CLEARY REPORT, supra note 125, at 4–5 (“The Regulation was found to accord less 
favorable treatment to imported products inconsistently with GATT Art. III:4.”).  See 
supra note 33 for a discussion about the function of GATT. 
 131 USTR Press Release, supra note 124, at 2. 
 132 Id. at 3. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. Panel Report, WT/DS174/R, supra note 121; Panel Report, WT/DS290/R, supra 
note 121; see also CLEARY REPORT, supra note 125, at 4–5 & n.12. 
 136 CLEARY REPORT, supra note 125, at 4–5. 
 137 USTR Press Release, supra note 124. 
 138 Id. 
 139 The Panel found that the equivalence and reciprocity requirement was applicable 
only to undertakings established in Non-E.U. countries and as such was inconsistent with 
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other components were TRIPs compatible.140  Accordingly, the 
final report issued by the WTO in March 2005 was seen as a 
victory for both sides.141  The United States considered that the 
WTO had issued a clear ruling that the Regulation had 
discriminated against food producers in the United States.142  Peter 
Allgeier, the acting U.S. Trade Representative, said: “The WTO 
issued a crystal clear ruling that agreed with our view that Europe 
failed to provide Americans fair access . . . .”143  He went on to 
state that “[t]hese findings are important to the rights of U.S. 
companies protecting their trademarks in Europe.”144  The 
European Union also interpreted the ruling positively.  The 
European Union Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, stated: 
“By confirming that geographical indications are both legal and 
compatible with existing trademark systems, this WTO decision 
will help the EU to ensure wider recognition of geographical 
indications and protection of regional and local product identities 
 
Article 3.1 because national treatment does not allow a WTO Member to require other 
Members to adopt particular standards or procedural rules as a condition for protecting 
their nation’s intellectual property.  In addition the Panel found that the application 
procedures and the objection procedures, which provided only E.U. nationals with a 
direct means of applying for or objecting to GI’s, were also inconsistent with Article 3.1.  
Finally, requiring undertakings from non-E.U. countries to seek support or participation 
of their governments in various procedures which undertakings established in the E.U. 
did not need (under Article 10 or 12 of the Regulation) were also found to violate the 
national treatment principle. See Cleary Report, supra note 125, at 5. 
 140 Regarding trademarks, the Panel found the Regulation to be technically inconsistent 
with TRIPs Article 16.1 with respect to the co-existence of GIs with prior trademarks.  
Nevertheless it found the Regulation to be justified by Article 17 of the same agreement 
(which allows Members to provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a 
trademark so long as such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the owner 
of the trademark). Id. 
 141 Id. at 5; see also Posting of William New to Intellectual Property Watch, Both Sides 
Claim Victory in Geographical Indications Dispute, at 1, (Mar. 15, 2005, 9:44 GMT), 
available at http://www.ip-watch.org/ (click on “Go to calendar of posts”; under the 
heading “IP policies” click on  “Trademarks/Geographical Indications”); see also 
CLEARY REPORT, supra note 125, at 5 (“The United States greeted the decision because it 
confirmed that the EU’s GI’s regime violated WTO law.  The EU also expressed 
satisfaction because the panel report upheld that the EU is entitled to have a GI system 
and ‘simply’ requires it to facilitate direct access to the system by undertakings 
established in third countries.”). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
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which is one of our goals in the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations”.145  Disappointingly, the WTO panel decision did not 
clarify the scope of geographical indications and did little to quell 
the strength of the regulatory disagreement. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE SCHISM: A TALE OF TWO HISTORIES 
The theoretical underpinnings of the American intellectual 
property system are principally utilitarian.  Intellectual property 
law exists to provide a marketable right for creators and inventors 
of protected works, which in turn creates an incentive for 
production and dissemination of new products.  Consequently, it is 
logical to justify granting a monopoly for a limited period of time 
to an inventor or creator of a product.  This not only ensures that 
the inventor or creator has an incentive to create and produce, but 
also ensures that society has the opportunity to benefit from the 
work or product once it is released into the public domain. 
In stark contrast, the European146 justifications for intellectual 
property protection are grounded in the theory of droit d’auteur, 
where the right holder is considered to have a personal and 
inalienable connection to the product.147  Droit d’auteur 
encompasses the right to prevent distortion, destruction and 
misattribution of a product.148  Contrasting the different rationales 
underlying the intellectual property regimes in Europe and the 
United States, it is not surprising that the response to extension of 
the existing regime governing geographical indications is 
 
 145 Id. 
 146 This refers primarily to Continental Europe. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 33, at 408. 
 147 Droit d’auteur literally means “right of the author.”  “‘Droit’  n.m. right, equity; law; 
right (to) claim, title, fee; due (tax), duty, customs duty.” CASSELL’S FRENCH ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 123.  “‘[A]uteur’ n.m. author, creator, maker; writer (of a 
book etc.); perpetrator, achiever, contriver, framer; composer, sculptor; informant, 
authority, droit d’auteur, royalty.” CASSELL’S FRENCH ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 
10, at 33.  At its core is droit moral, the doctrine of “moral rights,” which provides an 
author with the following: 1) the right of integrity, 2) the right of paternity, 3) the right of 
disclosure and 4) the right of withdrawal, although the scope varies within legal regimes. 
Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ 
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 3–5 (1980) 
(discussing droit d’auteur in France and the United States). 
 148 Id. 
AGDOMAR_121907_FINAL 12/19/2007  4:46:53 PM 
572 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
divergent.  It is for this reason that this debate has also been 
identified as one between the “New World” and the “Old 
World.”149  Members of the old world justify their desire to 
recognize the link between region and product in the notion of 
terroir.150  The concept of terroir lies at the heart of the nexus 
between trade and culture.  James E. Wilson stated: 
The true concept is not easily grasped but includes 
physical elements of the vineyard habitat—the vine, 
subsoil, siting, drainage and microclimate.  Beyond 
the measurable ecosystem, there is an additional 
dimension—the spiritual aspect that recognizes the 
joys, the heartbreaks, the pride, the sweat and the 
frustrations of its history.151 
“[G]eographical indications as a form of intellectual property 
challenge the law, culture and economic logic of American 
business, oriented as it is towards liberal economic theory based on 
individual ownership,” the antithesis of terroir.152  However, even 
in American intellectual property law, one can detect strands of the 
notion that inventors or creators have certain natural rights in their 
works—an idea that is in large measure derived from the works of 
 
 149 See Felix Addor, The Way Ahead – What Future for Geographical Indications?, 
Parma, Italy, 27–29 June 2005, at 2, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/ 
www/meetings/en/2005/geo_pmf/presentations/doc/wipo_geo_pmf_05_addor.doc 
(stating that “unlike in many other instances in the WTO, geographical indications are an 
issue where the dividing line among Members is not congruent with the North-South 
divide.  Instead, it is rather a controversy between ‘emigrant’ countries (Europe, Africa 
and parts of Asia) and ‘immigrant’ countries (USA, Australia and Latin American 
countries).”); see also Rangnekar, supra note 23, at 2; supra notes 7–9 and accompanying 
text. 
 150 “‘[T]erroir’ n.m. soil, ground;gout de terroir, raciness (of style); native tang (of 
wine).” CASSELL’S FRENCH ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 312.  Terroir was 
originally a French term used in wine appreciation to denote the special characteristics of 
geography that bestowed individuality upon the wine, it can be loosely translated as the 
sum of effects that the natural environment has had upon the manufacture of the product. 
Terroir, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terroir (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). 
 151 JAMES E. WILSON, TERROIR: THE ROLE OF GEOLOGY, CLIMATE, AND CULTURE IN THE 
MAKING OF FRENCH WINES 55 (Stephanie Horner ed., University of California Press 
1998). 
 152 Elizabeth Barham, Translating Terroir: The Global Challenge of French AOC 
Labeling, 19 J. OF RURAL STUDIES 127, 129 (2003). 
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John Locke.153  Moreover, the implementation of the Visual Artists 
Right Act of 1990 (“VARA”) is evidence that Congress is willing 
to legislate to protect natural rights in compliance with its 
international treaty obligations.154  VARA was adopted to comply 
with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.155  VARA grants the 
author of a “work of visual art” the right of attribution and the right 
to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of the work that would be prejudicial to the artists’ 
reputation.156  While the right is narrowly defined, it reflects 
Congress’s willingness to meander away from a strictly utilitarian 
framework when crafting new laws to protect right holders.  In the 
realm of geographical indications the Wine Agreement bill was a 
small concession on the part of the United States to protect against 
the misattribution of goods. 
A divergent history alone, however, is not enough to explain 
the schism between the Old World Members and the New World 
Members.  For example, it does not explain why both have support 
from developing countries which have alternate rationales 
underpinning their intellectual property systems.157  Countries such 
as India158 and China159 have both enacted legislation to provide 
 
 153 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 303–20 (Cambridge University 
Press 1960) (1698). 
 154 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). 
 155 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, as last revised Sept. 28, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; Edward J. Damich, The Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for 
Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 945–46 (1990).  The Berne Convention is one of the 
major international treaties that harmonize intellectual property laws. COHEN ET AL., 
supra note 33, at 35; TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, supra note 37, at 47.  
The United States acceded to the Berne Convention with the implementation of the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1998. 100 Pub. L. No. 568, 102 Stat. 2853. 
 156 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 157 See supra notes 7 and 9 for a list of Old World Members and New World Members; 
see generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE 1–29 
(Stanford University Press 1995) (discussing the underpinnings of Chinese copyright 
law). 
 158 The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration & Protection) Act, No. 48 of 
1999, India Code (1999). 
 159 Intellectual Property Protection in China, Provisions for the Protection of Products 
with Geographical Indications (promulgated by the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, May 16, 2005, effective July 15, 2005), 
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enhanced protection for geographical indications.  The fact is that 
WTO members and their nationals are increasingly recognizing 
that geographical indications are valuable marketing tools and thus 
have commercial importance in the global economy.160  There is 
also increasing recognition that the nexus between culture and 
trade is real and that the international community desires to 
develop a legal mechanism to preserve culture as globalization 
leads to increased homogeneity.  This is exemplified by the 
ratification of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity 
(“CCD”) in October 2005.161  The objective of the CCD is to 
ensure that culture, in the age of globalization, is not reduced to a 
commodity.162  Notably, the United States was one of two 
countries who opposed adoption of the CCD.163 
 
available at http://www.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a_no=2158&col_no=119& 
dir=200603. 
 160 See Beijing Symposium, supra note 69, at 4 (stating that “over the past years more 
and more countries around the world have established sui generis systems of GI 
protection. . .over 13 countries in Asia (such as Mongolia, North Korea, Thailand and 
Vietnam among others) have established GI protection in the last 5 years.  In the same 
line since 2000 over 12 countries from North and Latin America have adopted a sui 
generis system of GI protection”); Manuel Ruiz and Isabel Lapena, New Peruvian Law 
Protects Indigenous Peoples’ Collective Knowledge, available at http://www.ictsd.org/ 
monthly/bridges/BRIDGES.6-3.pdf; see also ICTSD project, supra note 103, at 10; 
Communication from the Permanent Mission of Australia to the Members of the World 
Trade Organization Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
IP/C/W/211 (Oct. 19, 2000), at 3–4, available at http://docsonline.wto.org (follow 
“Simple Search” hyperlink; then enter “IP/C/W/211” in the “Document symbol” field 
and click the “Search” button; click the “E” hyperlink to download the file); Focus on 
Geographical Indications at Meet, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 23, 2002, available at 2002 
WLNR 7364857. 
 161 See Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, Oct. 20, 2005, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/ 
142919e.pdf [hereinafter “CCD”].  On December 18, 2006 the UNESCO General 
Conference ratified the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions.  On October 20, 2005, 148 countries approved its adoption while 
two countries, Israel and the United States, voted against and four countries abstained.  
The Convention entered into force in March 2007. Choike.org, In Depth: UNESCO 
Convention on Cultural Diversity, http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/2286.html 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Choike]. 
 162 See United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 
CLT/CEI/DCE/2007/PI/32, at 5, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001495/ 
149502E.pdf (adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 33rd session in 
2005); see also Michael Hahn, A Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention 
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Ratification of the CCD is of ominous portent.  It is a clear 
signal that cultural diversity and cultural preservation are 
considered to be fundamental human rights by many WTO 
members and their nationals.  However, the CCD does not have the 
same powers of enforcement that TRIPs possesses through its 
Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”).164  If the DSB determines that a 
WTO Member state is not compliant with its TRIPs obligations the 
panel can impose sanctions against the offending state.165  
Accordingly, any meaningful form of extension of the current 
geographical indication regime must take place via the auspices of 
the TRIPs Agreement. 
Neo-Marxists have often alleged that the devastation of local 
cultures is the product of a triumph of cultural hegemony;166 it is 
this that demandeurs seek to prevent with the establishment of a 
 
and International Trade Law, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 515, 517–18 (discussing the concerns 
of some of the states who have expressed support for the CCD); Long, supra note 64, at 
233 (“At the heart of present-day globalization is a fast food, fast information, consumer 
culture that seems largely based on the cultural icons of Western consumerism.  CNN, 
McDonald’s, Mickey Mouse, and MTV have arguably become among the most potent 
icons of global consumer culture that has a homogenizing effect as local traditions are 
replaced by MTV, Hollywood movies and American-logoed clothing.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 163 See Hahn, supra note 162, at 516; see also Choike, supra note 161. 
 164 The DSB is the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.  When WTO Member States 
have a dispute, the DSB reviews reports prepared by a panel comprised of three to five 
experts from different WTO Member States, who are usually chosen in consultation with 
the countries in dispute.  The panelists examine the evidence and produce a report 
detailing which country is right or wrong.  The panel’s report is then submitted to the 
DSB for approval and can only be rejected by consensus.  The report becomes the DSB’s 
ruling or recommendation within sixty days unless there is a consensus to reject the 
report or if the report is appealed.  A WTO Member States’ failure to comply with the 
recommendation in the final judgment can lead to the imposition of sanctions against it. 
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: A Unique Contribution, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 
2007). 
 165 Id.; see also Convention on Biological Diversity, Analysis Of Options For 
Implementing Disclosure Of Origin Requirements In Intellectual Property Applications—
Submission By UNCTAD, March 2006, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/ 
cop/cop-08/information/cop-08-inf-25-en.pdf (“The TRIPS Agreement is the most 
appropriate treaty regime in which to adopt mandatory disclosure of origin requirements. 
. . . Particularly in light of the broad membership in the WTO and its existing dispute 
resolution procedures.”). 
 166 Tomer Broude, Taking “Trade and Culture” Seriously: Geographical Indications 
and Cultural Protection in WTO Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 623, 634 (2005). 
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legally binding multilateral register open to all products applicable 
all WTO Member States.167  It is reasonable to conclude that in 
more established areas of intellectual property, right holders have 
accepted that protecting intellectual property is no longer just a 
domestic endeavor.168  Moreover, as defined in TRIPs, 
geographical indications are an intellectual property right equal to 
trademarks, designs or patents.  None of these rights discriminate 
among categories of products in granting effective protection.169  
As the quest for heightened protection for right holders advances, 
so too must the willingness of Member states to recognize the 
importance of protecting non-traditional intellectual property such 
as cultural products.  Professor Susan Scafidi argues that 
intellectual property law should not allow unlimited appropriation 
of intangible goods, including cultural products, but rather protect 
them.170  Scafidi suggests that intellectual property law could 
“provide the mechanism to balance the scales, to temper cultural 
contribution with cultural protection.”171  The geographical 
indication, as defined in TRIPs, has the potential to fulfill that 
role.172  Developing heightened geographical indication protection 
would show that the United States is genuinely committed to 
assisting emerging economies to benefit from the growth in world 
trade.  Indeed, the quest for extension of protection for 
geographical indications internationally should be considered the 
natural and logical progression in the global ratcheting up of 
intellectual property standards. 
 
 167 See Beijing Symposium, supra note 69, at 5. 
 168 This phenomenon is exemplified by the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement, 
and the frequent use of Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) by the international trading 
community. See Pedro Roffe & David Vivas-Eugui, A Shift in Intellectual Property 
Policy in US FTAs?, BRIDGES, Aug. 2007, at 15 (discussing U.S. FTAs and the fact that, 
since the Uruguay Round negotiations and the adoption of TRIPs, the U.S. has pursued 
expanded commitments in the area of intellectual property in more than fifteen Free 
Trade Agreements); YAMIN, supra note 62 (discussing U.S. and E.U. conclusion of bi-
lateral investment treaties (“BITS”)). 
 169 See Beijing Symposium, supra note 69, at 5. 
 170 SCAFIDI, supra note 86, at 154. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See TRIPs, supra note 13, arts. 22–24. 
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III. THE CRI DE COUER FOR EXTENSION IS A GUISE FOR EUROPEAN 
TRADE PROTECTIONISM: APHORISM OR MYTH?173 
New World Members consider extension of the existing regime 
tantamount to European trade protectionism.174  In their view 
extension of the current regime governing geographical indications 
is unjustified, 175 and will not necessarily guarantee market access 
and opportunities for emerging industries.176  It is their belief that 
extending the level of protection encapsulated in Article 23.1 to all 
geographical indications would require unwarranted government 
intervention which is inconsistent with the principle that 
intellectual property rights are private rights.177  Moreover 
opponents are concerned that extension of the current regime will 
encourage monopolistic behavior.178  So is the cry for extension 
really just about European protectionism or are there legitimate 
reasons to support the request? 
The geographical indication and the trademark both protect 
source identifications and are also often indicators of quality.  
However, there are major differences between geographical 
indications and trademarks, namely the link with a region as 
opposed to an individual or entity.  Trademarks can be sold, 
 
 173 “‘Cri de coeur,’ French, n. (pl. cris de coeur pronunc. same) a passionate appeal or 
complaint.  ORIGIN Fr. ‘cry from the heart.’” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
supra note 1, at 337. 
 174 See Scott Miller, Europe Says, ‘That Cheese Is No Cheddar,’ WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 
2003, at B1 (“For New Worlders, the European idea is bald-faced protectionism. ‘This 
doesn’t speak about free trade; its [sic] about making a monopoly of trade,’ says Sergio 
Marichi, Canada’s ambassador to the W.T.O. ‘It’s hard to even calculate the cost and 
confusion of administering such a thing.’”); see also SABRINA LUCATELLI, APPELLATIONS 
OF ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES: ECONOMIC 
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 19 (2000), http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/ag/resources/docs/ 
OECD_GI.pdf (discussing the risk of obstacles to market entry if the current regime is 
extended). 
 175 Tegan Brink, Geographical Indications: Prospects for the Development of the 
International Legal Framework, at 6, June 26–28 2007, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
mdocs/geoind/en/wipo_geo_bei_07/wipo_geo_bei_07_www_81778.pdf. 
 176 Id. at 9. 
 177 Id. at 22 (the national government would be required to assert and defend the 
geographical indication). 
 178 See Addor et al., supra note 24; LUCATELLI, supra note 174, at 16 (discussing the 
potential risk of monopolistic cartels). 
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licensed or delocalized, a geographical indication cannot.179  A 
trademark is an individual right; a geographical indication is 
available to any producer or manufacturer of the region or territory 
concerned.180  In general trademark registration does not cover 
translation, nor does it prevent the use of the name with a 
corrective.181  In stark contrast geographical indication protection 
covers the name, its translation in any language and the use of a 
corrective.182  Additionally, in order for a trademark to remain in 
force it must be used in commerce.183  However, the geographical 
indication gives indefinite protection regardless of the use of such 
product, and once it is registered it will never become generic.184  
These differences partially explain New World Members’ 
reluctance to accept enhanced geographical indication protection.  
Nevertheless, both trademarks and geographical indications are 
deemed valuable business interests.185  Thus, despite these 
differences it is no surprise that many of the justifications that 
support trademark law are analogous to the existence of 
geographical indications.  Accordingly, developing substantive 
international legislation to protect geographical indications should 
not cause the United States such consternation. 
One of the goals of trademark law is to protect against 
likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception about the source, 
affiliation or sponsorship of goods.186  Accordingly, the underlying 
rationale for trademark protection is to prevent consumer 
confusion concerning the source of products and to lower 
 
 179 See supra note 45, at 4. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See Beijing Symposium, supra note 69, at 3. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See id. at 4 (referencing that countries recognize the need for a specific geographical 
indication protection system that coexists with trademark regimes). 
 186 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (“Any person who shall, without the consent of the 
registrant— a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable 
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, 
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action 
by the registrant . . . .” ); see also GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 37, at 391. 
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consumer search costs.187  Additionally, Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act protects against false or misleading statements of fact 
in commercial advertising or promotion.188  The section provides 
further evidence that the moorings of trademark protection 
gravitate around preventing consumer confusion.  Trademark 
infringement is also considered a form of unfair competition.189  
Thus it is fair to conclude that there is also business rationale 
couched in trademark protection.  Finally, there is a producer 
incentive rationale justifying trademark protection;190 if a producer 
invests in developing, advertising and selling a product, his 
investment should be protected.191  The desire to protect the 
goodwill in a product is reflected in the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act.192  This statute protects the owner of a highly 
distinctive or famous mark against dilution by the blurring of its 
 
 187 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269–70 (1987). 
 188 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) (governing federal trademark law but not all U.S. trademark 
law, since both common law and state law cover some aspects of trademark protection). 
 189 GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 37, at 47; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §1(a) (2) (1995) (“One who causes harm to the commercial relations of 
another by engaging in a business or trade is not subject to liability to the other for such 
harm unless: (a) the harm results from acts or practices of the actor actionable by the 
other under the rules of the Restatement relating to: (2) infringement of trademarks and 
other indicia of identification.”). 
 190 Supra notes 191–192. 
 191 Infra note 192; see Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312 
(2006), § (2)(c) [hereinafter TDRA] (stating that “the owner of a famous mark that is 
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an 
injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become 
famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause 
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the 
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic 
injury”); see also Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance Of the Dilution Rationale 
For Trademark—Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289 (1984) (“Dilution 
results when use of a mark by others generates awareness that the mark no longer 
signifies anything unique, singular or particular, but instead may (or does) denominate 
several varying items from varying sources.  In short, when use of the same or similar 
marks by others has caused a mark to become less distinctive than before, it has been 
diluted.”). 
 192 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 was recently amended by the TDRA of 
2006. See TDRA, supra note 191; 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000 & Supp. 2006).  Some states 
also have dilution statutes. GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 37, at 47. 
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distinctiveness or the tarnishment of its image even if there is no 
likelihood of consumer confusion.193 
The main contention of the New World members is that the 
freedom to compete,194 which is a fundamental premise of the free 
enterprise system, will be impeded if extension of the existing 
geographical indication regime is implemented.195  However, the 
aforementioned justifications for trademark law make it clear that, 
even within the free enterprise model, a party who engages in 
deceptive marketing or infringement of other indicia of 
identification should be held liable for any harm caused as a result 
of such practice.196 
Indeed, it is reasonable to conclude that trademark law,197 
unfair competition law,198 false advertising,199 and the common 
law doctrine of passing-off200 are all examples of legal 
mechanisms that have evolved within the American legal system to 
prevent free riding,201 dilution202 and deceptive or misleading trade 
practices.203  Extension of the existing geographical indication 
regime seeks to protect cultural products from the same vices.  
Accordingly, a case can be made that this cri de couer requesting 
heightened geographical indication protection is about more than 
mere European protectionism. 
A. Free Riding and Dilution: Effects on the Producer 
The demandeurs maintain that the current protection for 
geographical indications for goods other than wine or spirits is 
 
 193 See TDRA, supra note 191, § (2)(c) 
 194 “Freedom to compete is freedom to engage in business and to compete for the 
patronage of prospective customers, . . . it implies a right to induce prospective customers 
to do business with the actor rather than with the actor’s competitors.” GINSBURG ET AL., 
supra note 37, at 31–32. 
 195 Id. 
 196 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995). 
 197 Supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 198 Supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 199 Supra notes 188 and 190 and accompanying text. 
 200 See infra notes 236–237. 
 201 See supra note 188–189. 
 202 See supra notes 191–192. 
 203 See supra 188–192. 
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ineffective.  The rationale for extension is that, in its current form, 
Article 22 permits free riding and risks a geographical indication 
being rendered generic.  This is exemplified by cases like basmati 
rice204 and parmesan cheese, which are registered geographical 
indications in Europe, but are generic terms in the United States.205  
Extension of the geographical indication legislation would protect 
against such agropiracy, as all goods would be treated under the 
automatic and objective test set forth in Article 23.1.  This would 
ensure that the geographical indication protection for the term 
‘basmati’, its translation in any language and the use of the term 
with a corrective such as ‘American basmati’ would be 
prohibited.206  Such is the case for wines and spirits.207  Members 
opposing geographical indication extension suggest that the threat 
of geographical indications becoming generic is overstated and that 
“free and fair imitation of the product often enhances the intrinsic 
value (and premium) of the genuine [geographical indication].”208  
This line of reasoning would not be accepted to justify imitation 
products within another branch of intellectual property and there is 
no legitimate reason that it should accepted for geographical 
indications.209  However, this alone is not sufficient to rebuff 
claims of European protectionism.  If it is accepted that the goals 
of trademark law are akin to those of geographical indication 
protection then the following arguments for extension can be 
made. 
First, one of the cornerstones of trademark law is to prevent 
free riding on the goodwill of the reputation of the trademark 
owner.210  This reflects a producer protection rationale.  Society 
recognizes that when an individual or an entity has invested time, 
skill, labor and knowledge in developing a mark, that investment 
 
 204 See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 211–217 and 
accompanying text. 
 205 See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 206 See Beijing Symposium, supra note 69, at 3; see also TN/IP/W/11, supra note 12 
(proposal from the E.U. concerning extension of geographical indication protection). 
 207 See Beijing Symposium, supra note 69, at 3.  See also supra notes 114–115 for more 
detailed information about use of a “corrective” concerning TRIPs geographical 
indication protection. 
 208 ICTSD project, supra note 103, at 8 (quoting IP/C/W/289, at 5–6). 
 209 ICTSD project, supra note 103, at 8–9 (citing IP/C/W/308/Rev.1, para. 18, at 5–6). 
 210 Supra notes 184–185. 
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should be protected.  In the same vein, a case can be made that 
preventing free riding on the reputation and quality of a product 
that has foreign geographical indication protection is socially 
desirable.  The case of basmati rice is a pertinent example.  The 
controversy was initiated by a 1997 grant of a United States patent 
to Rice Tec, Inc.,211 on a variety of basmati rice and grains.212  In 
essence, the patent stated that certain basmati plant and grain 
characteristics were not dependent on the growing environment.213  
“[W]ith the Basmati patent rights, RiceTec will . . . be able to not 
only call its aromatic rice Basmati within the U.S., but also label it 
Basmati for its exports.”214  “This has grave repercussions for 
India . . . because . . . India [will] lose out on the 45,000 tonne U.S. 
import market, which forms 10% of the total Basmati 
exports . . . .”215  In 2000, the Indian government challenged the 
patents on the grounds of inventiveness216 and consequently, in 
2001, the United States Patent and Trademark Office narrowed the 
 
 211 See Adewumi, supra note 24 (“RiceTec Inc, had been trying to enter the international 
Basmati market with brands like ‘Kasmati’ and ‘Texmati’ described as Basmati-type rice 
with minimal success.”). 
 212 U.S. Patent No. 5,663,484 (filed July 8, 1994) (issued Sept. 2, 1997).  The abstract 
states: 
The invention relates to novel rice lines and to plants and grains of 
these lines and to a method for breeding these lines.  The invention 
also relates to a novel means for determining the cooking and starch 
properties of rice grains and its use in identifying desirable rice lines.  
Specifically, one aspect of the invention relates to novel rice lines 
whose plants are semi-dwarf in stature, substantially photoperiod 
insensitive and high yielding, and produce rice grains having 
characteristics similar or superior to those of good quality basmati 
rice.  Another aspect of the invention relates to novel rice grains 
produced from novel rice lines.  The invention provides a method for 
breeding these novel lines.  A third aspect of the invention relates to 
the finding that the “starch index” (SI) of a rice grain can predict the 
grain’s cooking and starch properties, to a method based thereon for 
identifying grains that can be cooked to the firmness of traditional 
basmati rice preparations, and to the use of this method in selecting 
desirable segregants in rice breeding programs. 
Id.  “In June 2000, India, supported by ActionAid, challenge [the] RiceTec Inc. 
patents . . . .” YAMIN, supra note 62, at 61. 
 213 See Adewumi, supra note 24; Rangnekar, supra note 23, at 5. 
 214 See Adewumi, supra note 24. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See YAMIN, supra note 62, at 61. 
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patents.217  At about the same time, the Indian government also 
filed a petition with the Federal Trade Commission requesting that 
the agency regulate the use of the term “basmati” in domestic 
advertising.218  The United States Federal Trade Commission ruled 
that the labeling of “American grown” basmati rice was not 
misleading and deemed basmati a generic term.219  The Federal 
Trade Commission stated that there was no evidence “to suggest 
that U.S. grown rice is being misrepresented as rice from other 
parts of the world.”220  The Federal Trade Commission relied on 
the Department of Agriculture’s regulations, which defines basmati 
rice as “aromatic rough rice”221 that is “not limited to rice grown in 
any particular country.”222  Therein rests the problem with the 
current system of protection; if a national court determines that 
Texmati “American style basmati rice” does not confuse the 
public, there is no protection for the foreign geographical 
indication.  This ruling sharply contrasts with marketing 
regulations in the United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia where only 
particular aromatic rice varieties from the Indian subcontinent are 
accepted as basmati.223  The case of basmati rice also shows that 
use by third countries other than the original producer, even with 
the addition of delocalizing terminology such as “style,” 
“imitation” and “made in,” does not sufficiently protect against a 
geographical indication becoming generic.  American 
manufacturers, such as Lundberg,224 who make basmati rice, are 
free riding on the extensive goodwill and customer recognition of 
basmati.  After all, why else would a producer call rice “basmati” 
 
 217 Rangnekar, supra note 23 (stating that many of RiceTec’s claims were rejected after 
the challenge to the patents by the Indian government). 
 218 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Commission Denial of Petition for 
Rulemaking Proceeding (May 15, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/05/fyi0131.shtm. 
 219 See Letter from Donald Clark, Secretary, Federal Trade Commission, to Charlotte A. 
Cristin, Joseph Mendelson & Andrew Kimbrell (May 9, 2001), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/riceletter.pdf (responding to a petition challenging the 
advertising of U.S. grown rice as “Basmati” or “Jasmine”). 
 220 Id. 
 221 See 7 C.F.R. § 868.212(e) (2007). 
 222 USTR Press Release, supra note 124. 
 223 Rangnekar, supra note 23, at 5. 
 224 See supra note 21. 
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if it is not to free ride on the reputation, characteristic or quality of 
the original product? 
Second, protection against dilution of a trademark also reflects 
a producer protection principle.225  Dilution protects a trademark 
owner against the tarnishment226 or the blurring227 of a 
trademark.228  Use of the term “basmati” for rice that does not 
possess its inherent qualities and that is not subjected to the same 
production process does tarnish the reputation of the original good.  
Additionally, the regional producer may suffer serious financial 
losses.229  In the case of developing nations, regional producers 
have been impacted by lowered trade barriers at the border and 
thus have been exposed to competition from foreign imports.230  
These foreign imports are often from countries in the North who 
have spent millions of dollars on agricultural programs,231 driving 
down world prices and flooding commodity markets with 
subsidized goods.232  Extension of geographical indications should 
be viewed as an attempt to level the playing field.  The case of 
Rwandan coffee is the quintessence of this phenomenon.  
Worldwide overproduction of high yielding coffee varieties caused 
 
 225 Rangnekar, supra note 23, at 2; see also supra notes 180–184 and accompanying 
text. 
 226 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2000) (“‘[D]ilution by tarnishment’ is association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name . . . that harms the reputation of the 
famous mark.”). 
 227 Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (“‘[D]ilution by blurring’ is association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the 
distinctiveness of the famous mark.”). 
 228 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
 229 See generally LEWIS MERIAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (Johns 
Hopkins Press 1928), available at http://www.alaskool.org/native_ed/research_reports/ 
IndianAdmin/Indian_Admin_Problms.html (discussing the impact on the Native 
American community when their cultural products were not protected from counterfeiting 
and misappropriation). 
 230 See supra note 223. 
 231 See Celia Dugger, CARE Turns Down Federal Funds for Food Aid, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 16, 2007, at A1 (discussing the charity CARE refusing Federal Aid in the amount of 
$45 million and stating that that “CARE’s decision is focused on the practice of selling 
tons of often heavily subsidized American farm products in African countries that in 
some cases . . . compete with the crops of struggling local farmers”). 
 232 See Charlton & Stiglitz, supra note 34, at 19 (discussing some of the weaknesses in 
the “aid for trade” schemes run by the European Union and the United States); see also 
YAMIN, supra note 62, at 49. 
AGDOMAR_121907_FINAL 12/19/2007  4:46:53 PM 
2008] THE PARADOX OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 585 
conventional coffee prices to bottom out in the late 1990’s.233  
Since 2000, Rwandan cooperatives have developed to market 
specialty Rwandan coffee with the result that “about 40,000 of 
Rwanda’s 500,000 coffee farmers have at least doubled their 
incomes.”234  Extension of the existing geographical indication 
regime would ensure that such products receive automatic and near 
universal protection.235 
Third, the common law tort of passing off also evolved to 
protect the reputation of producers against people seeking to trade 
on that reputation.236  Broadly speaking, it bars anyone from 
passing his product off as someone else’s.237  Similarly, 
geographical indications can also help to protect the reputation of 
producers.238 
Fourth, the law of Unfair Competition also bars a producer or 
manufacturer from engaging in deceptive trade practices.239  
Permitting the sale of counterfeit goods has an impact on many 
communities’ cultural and ethnic identities.240  An example of the 
damage that can be caused by failing to correct misleading or 
deceptive labeling of products can be found in the Native 
American community.241  In a 1928 report titled “The Problem of 
 
 233 See Laura Fraser, Coffee, and Hope, Grow in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, at 
C1. 
 234 Id. 
 235 See generally TRIPs, supra note 13 (explaining that only WTO Member States 
would be bound by geographical indication protection pursuant to the TRIPs Agreement 
absent an additional agreement between any respective parties/nations). 
 236 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
25:1 (4th ed. 2006); see also SociologyIndex.com, Passing Off and Trade Marks Law, 
http://sociologyindex.com/passing_off_and_trade_marks_law.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 
2007). 
 237 See LUCATELLI, supra note 174, at 12 para. 27. 
 238 See TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 22(b). 
 239 See supra note 188. 
 240 Jennie D. Woltz, The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation: How Should the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 Be Marketed?, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 443, 455 (2007). 
 241 See generally LEWIS MERIAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (Johns 
Hopkins Press 1928), available at http://www.alaskool.org/native_ed/research_reports/ 
IndianAdmin/Indian_Admin_Problms.html (discussing the impact on the Native 
American community when their cultural products were not protected from counterfeiting 
and misappropriation); see also Woltz, supra note 240. 
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Indian Administration,” Lewis Meriam identified that the Native 
American community was facing abject poverty.242  Congress 
recognized that many Native Americans made their living solely 
by selling arts and crafts.  Mass produced counterfeit goods were 
diverting income from the source community with dire 
consequences.  The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 
(“IACA”)243  was a response to this problem.  The Act made it a 
crime for a non-Indian to sell goods in a manner that falsely 
suggests that they are Indian made.244  In tandem with the 
principles of false advertising, the concept behind this prohibition 
is a logical one.  Producers are obligated to indicate the true origin 
of their product.  This prevents consumer confusion and deception.  
The legislators also recognized that the effect of counterfeit 
products was offensive to many Native American communities.  
Furthermore, the implementation of IACA reflects Congress’s 
recognition of the need “to balance the often-ignored human 
factors that are part of local production, especially in the context of 
handicrafts, with the desire to literally ‘spread the wealth’ across 
the globe . . . .”245  In the same vein, extension of the current 
geographical indication regime is a vehicle to achieve the same 
goal on an international platform by assisting developing countries 
to secure meaningful and beneficial integration into the multilateral 
trading system.246  As one of the main reasons the issue of 
geographical indication extension is of particular interest to least 
developing and developing countries is because of the importance 
of the remunerative marketing of their agricultural, handicraft and 
artisan production.247  In addition, geographical indications have 
features that respond to the needs of indigenous and local 
communities and small farmers.248  Geographical indications are 
based on collective traditions and a collective decision making 
 
 242 See generally MERIAM, supra note 241; Woltz, supra note 240, at n.32. 
 243 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (2000). 
 244 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000). 
 245 Hughes et. al, That’s a Fine Chablis You’re Not Drinking: The Proper Place for 
Geographical Indications in Trademark Law, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT 
L.J. 933, 960 (2007) (comments by Susan Scafidi). 
 246 See DMD, supra note 30, para. 3. 
 247 See Addor et al., supra note 24. 
 248 Id. at 2. 
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process; they reward traditions while allowing for continued 
evolution; they emphasize the relationship between human efforts, 
land, resources and the environment; and they are not freely 
transferable from one owner to another.249 Moreover, IACA does 
not prohibit the sale of fake Native American goods; it simply 
prevents producers from holding goods out as Indian made when 
they are not.250  It is reasonable to surmise that extension would 
have the same effect on products covered by geographical 
indications.251  If a source community loses income as a result of a 
third country producer free riding on the goodwill of its product or 
from deceptive trade practices, there should be a mechanism in 
place to redress this harm.  This is in alignment with the principles 
of a free market economy.  Additionally, if consumers do not have 
confidence that the goods they are purchasing are authentic, this is 
bad for the international trading community.  Granting owners of a 
product property rights over their cultural products ensures control 
over the quality of the goods.  One of the functions of a trademark 
in the United States is serving as an indicator of quality; the 
geographical indication serves the same purpose.252  In addition to 
serving as an indicator of quality, a trademark is also a symbol of 
authenticity.  Likewise the geographical indication serves to 
authenticate a cultural product, allowing the producer to share their 
product with the public while protecting their property from 
unlawful misappropriation. 
B. The Economics of Geographical Indications 
“Economic analysis would suggest market failure as the 
rationale for [geographical indication] protection.”253  With regard 
to information theory, an asymmetry of information between 
 
 249 Id. at 2. 
 250 See 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000). 
 251 See Addor et al., supra note 24 (“GI protection does not prevent manufacturers from 
other regions to produce the same kind of product, it only prohibits them to sell it under 
the same geographical indication.  Consequently product markets with GI protection 
remain competitive vis à vis the product category.”). 
 252 See Babcock & Clemens, supra note 45, at 2 (discussing how maintaining price 
premiums on branded products leads to greater control over the quality of branded 
products). 
 253 See Addor et al., supra note 24, at 2. 
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producers and consumers gives rise to market failure.  The 
argument is that “[a]symmetrical information places the consumer 
in a position of weakness so that he cannot always [optimize] his 
choices.”254  Methods of improving communication include 
advertising, quality signs and authenticity certificates.255  Thus, 
geographical indications could be a solution to this problem as they 
signal quality and expertise.256  The geographical indication 
enables the consumer to distinguish between premium quality 
products and low end products.  Additionally, when products 
appear to be uniform the customer can be duped as the producer is 
the sole proprietor of any quality differences in goods that can then 
be sold to the consumer at the same price.257  It is clear that 
geographical indications would ameliorate these concerns via a 
transparent certification, or authentication process similar to the 
French appellation d’origine côntrolée (“AOC”).258  Accordingly, 
the extension of geographical indication protection could promote 
product safety as producers would be more readily identifiable and 
could more easily be held responsible for their products.  “When 
consumers buy on the basis of the product’s reputation, a producer 
who decides to go into the high-quality market is compelled to 
invest in order to build his reputation.”259  Manufacturers and 
producers with premium quality products are more likely to invest 
in upgrading their product in order to maintain a competitive edge 
if they are afforded sufficient protection.260 
 
 254 LUCATELLI, supra note 174. 
 255 See id. at 8 para. 11. 
 256 Id. at para. 12. 
 257 Id. at para. 8. 
 258 Products covered by the French appellation d’origine côntrolée (“AOC”) labels are 
controlled by the state to ensure both their territorial origin and their conformity to 
precise rules for processing and production. See, e.g., D. BARJOLLE & J.-M. CHAPPUIS, 
SWISS FEDERAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY ZURICH, TRANSACTION COSTS AND ARTISANAL 
FOOD PRODUCTS 7–8, available at http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE00/Papers/Barjolle-
Chappuis.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2007) (discussing the exacting standards imposed for 
the production of Gruyère cheese in Switzerland). 
 259 LUCATELLI, supra note 174, at 8. 
 260 See Addor et al., supra note 24 (stating that producers with a solid reputation in 
quality products are more likely to invest continuously in upgrading their product 
portfolio to maintain a competitive edge (citing Fink, Smarzynska (2002)). 
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C. Search and Transaction Costs: Effects on the Consumer 
Opponents of geographical indication extension also argue that 
the cost to the consumer will be high.  As a result of re-labeling 
and re-packaging, consumers will be confused.261  There is of 
course the possibility that there would be a period of initial 
confusion but does that alone outweigh the long term benefits of 
extension?  Niche products are considered to attract more 
sophisticated buyers who are less likely to be confused by re-
labeling and re-packaging.262 
The cost of misidentification is expensive for the consumer 
also.  For example, sifting through different varieties of basmati 
rice in an attempt to locate authentic Indian basmati rice places a 
burden on the consumer.  Extension of geographical indications 
would ensure that consumers can trust their selection is authentic 
when opting for a product that uses a geographical indication. 
An argument can also be made that continuing under the 
present regime encourages deceptive trade practices.  The law of 
false advertising generally bars a producer or manufacturer from 
engaging in misleading or deceptive behavior.  The free market 
economy certainly does not promote misleading advertising.  Sarah 
F. Thorn of the Grocery Manufacturers of America argues that 
“[n]obody picks up Parmesan cheese263 in a green can and says, 
‘Ah! A fine Italian product’,”.264 This statement, while aphoristic 
for some consumers, is deeply disturbing for several reasons.  
First, consumers should be able to select a product and expect it to 
originate from the region advertised on the product.  Second, 
consumers do rely on the label and expect it to meet certain 
 
 261 See Addor et al., supra note 24, at 4. 
 262 In trademark infringement cases, when the courts consider whether there is a 
likelihood of confusion they take into account the sophistication of the buyer. See 
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 820 (1961).  While this is not an identical situation, the rationale for considering the 
sophistication of the buyer is relevant here. 
 263 “A hard dry Italian Cheese used chiefly in grated form.  ORIGIN C.16: from Fr., 
from Ital. Parmigiano ‘of Parma.’” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1, 
at 1038.  Parmesan cheese is an Italian cheese from the Parma region of Italy that takes 
up to two years to mature and contains no additives. Parmigiano-Reggiano, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parmesan_cheese (last visited Oct. 12, 2007). 
 264 Peter Gumbel, Food Fight!, TIME, Aug. 31, 2003, at 44. 
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standards of quality or to possess certain characteristics, whether 
regional or associated with a particular production process, 
associated with the appellation of the product. 
Geographical indication protection also contributes to the 
preservation of cultures of consumption, not just production.265  
The culture of consumption in one country is often inextricably 
linked to the culture of production in another country.  In order to 
sustain such a culture of consumption the consumers must be 
furnished with accurate information concerning the source of the 
product.  Wine is a good example of such a product as wine 
connoisseurs rely heavily on principles of source identification to 
select the wine they drink.266  Wine-pairings with meals rely on 
accurate source identification.  The variety and distinction make 
for a rich cultural experience.  The experience would be rendered 
meaningless if the consumer could not rely on the advertised origin 
of the wine as an indicator of particular characteristics and quality. 
D. Anti-competitive? 
The result of increased geographical indication protection 
would mean that producers outside of the designated region would 
be prohibited from using the geographical indication no matter 
how similar the product.  Critics of increased geographical 
indication protection argue that such a position is untenable in a 
laissez faire economy as it stifles competition.267  In 2002, Kraft 
had to change the name of its grated cheese in Europe from 
Parmigiano-Reggiano to Pamesello Italiano as the European Court 
of Justice determined that Parmesan was a protected designation of 
 
 265 Broude, supra note 166, at 669. 
 266 “Wine tasting n. judging the quality of wine by tasting it, an occasion for this.  
DERIVATIVES wine taster n.” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 
1639; see also HUGH JOHNSON & JANCIS ROBINSON, THE WORLD ATLAS OF WINE 20–24 
(Mitchell Beazley 2007) (1971) (discussing the relationship between geography and the 
taste of wine).  Specifically, the authors point out that “geography determines the nuances 
of how a wine tastes.” Id. at 20. 
 267 See Addor et al., supra note 24 (addressing opponents’ concerns that geographical 
indications are a means to close off future market access opportunities for developing 
countries). 
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origin.268  “Michael Pellegrino, a vice president in Kraft’s cheese 
division, told a congressional committee . . . that being forced to 
change the name of products such as Parmesan would likely 
‘require millions of dollars in packaging costs and an extensive, 
multi-million-dollar marketing campaign just to preserve, rather 
than grow, our existing levels of sales.’”269  However, protection of 
geographical indications does not prevent a manufacturer like 
Kraft from producing the same kind of product.  It merely prohibits 
them from using the same nomenclature and depriving a source 
community of deserved income.  This should stimulate 
competition and innovation.  Such producers are forced to develop 
innovative techniques to improve upon a product to compete vis à 
vis the product category. 
Moreover, the case of French wine is evidence that enhanced 
protection does not automatically stifle competition.  French wine 
sales have decreased in recent years despite the restrictive internal 
AOC system and the enhanced protection for wines and spirits 
under TRIPs.270  In contrast, wine sales have sharply increased 
from countries in the New World.  So arguments that enhanced 
protection for geographical indications will stifle competition are 
weakened.  The French have been forced to examine new ways to 
make their product more competitive.271  This is better for the 
consumer and encourages innovation.  Moreover, geographical 
indications that are no longer being used have been released into 
the public domain as the wines are no longer using that 
appellation.272  Additionally, the exceptions contained in Article 24 
would apply to extension as they do presently for geographical 
indications for wines and spirits.273  Article 24 permits the use of 
particular geographical indications of another Member with regard 
 
 268 Case C-66/00, Tribunale di Parma v. Dante Bigi, 2002 E.C.R. I-5917 (C-66/00 
2002). 
 269 Gumbel, supra note 264; see also Addor et al., supra note 24 (arguing that the cost 
of re-labeling, search, and transaction costs are short-sighted). 
 270 See, e.g., France Plans Export Drive to Boost Wine Sales, THE N.Z. HERALD, Dec. 
21, 2005, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/category/story.cfm?c_id=46&ObjectID=10360951. 
 271 Id. 
 272 See TRIPs supra note 13, art. 24.9. 
 273 Article 24 is a standstill provision but is commonly referred to as an exceptions 
provision. 
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to the same or similar goods if that Member used the geographical 
indication continuously for at least ten years preceding April 15, 
1994,274 or in good faith preceding that date.275 
 
E. A Worthwhile Expense? 
Opponents of extension further argue that the costs of 
implementing new laws and administrative mechanisms would be 
high.276  Presently, it is unclear whether the benefits of any 
proposed extension would exceed the burden placed upon poorer 
or developing nations.  Establishing domestic systems for 
geographical indication enforcement is a prerequisite for any 
meaningful form of international protection.  New World Members 
point out that most European Union countries already have 
existing mechanisms in place to monitor the enforcement of an 
enhanced geographical indication system.  Countries such as 
Argentina, Chile and Guatemala argue that the burden on poorer 
countries would be high as they do not have existing TRIPs plus277 
systems in place.278  This argument falls prey to several criticisms.  
First, there is no empirical data detailing the cost of the 
implementation of the extension.  Second, it is reasonable to 
conclude that these concerns exist with the implementation of any 
new rule created pursuant to a multilateral trade agreement. 
 
 274 See TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 24.4. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Miller, supra note 174. 
 277 TRIPs plus refers to requirements in bi-lateral treaties that impinge upon the 
flexibilities established in the TRIPs Agreement requiring developing countries to agree 
to new and expanded commitments in the area of intellectual property with their trade 
partners (usually the United States and the European Union), at the expense of public 
health. See infra note 350. 
 278 See Communication, Zambia—Implementation of Article 66.2 (Agenda Item D); 
Information on Technology Capacity-Building (Agenda Item E); and Review of the 
Implementation of the Agreement Under Article 71.1, IP/C/W/298 (June 20, 2001), 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ (follow “Simple Search” hyperlink; then enter 
“IP/C/W/298” in the “Document symbol” field and click the “Search” button; click the 
“E” hyperlink to download the file). 
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Moreover, the TRIPs Agreement does not mandate a particular 
system of protection279 so WTO Member states have considerable 
leeway when considering enforcement options.  WTO Member 
states would be free to employ the most cost effective system of 
administration. Members are already obliged to provide a legal 
means for aggrieved parties to prevent the misleading use of 
geographical indications.280  As a practical matter, many WTO 
countries have already established some kind of framework to 
protect geographical indications.  For example, the United States 
currently protects geographical indications as either a trademark281 
or as a certification mark.282  Additionally, an increasing number of 
countries are in the process of independently establishing their own 
national regulations to protect geographical indications.283  For 
example, “[the Australian government] has instituted a program for 
the labeling of authentic Aboriginal art destined for the market, 
including musical instruments.”284  The authentication mark 
protects the Aboriginal didgeridoo from counterfeits made from 
artificial materials and non-aboriginal designs that cause distress to 
the source community.285  This program halts the trade in 
counterfeit didgeridoos but does not stifle competition.  Rather, the 
authentication mark merely ensures that the right holder of the 
cultural product can benefit from the goodwill developed in the 
product.  Accordingly, before dismissing extension as mere 
European protectionism it is vital that individual countries attempt 
to calculate the one-off fixed costs associated with establishing 
 
 279 See TRIPs, supra note 13, arts. 22.2, 23.1.  The treaty merely states that each 
Member shall provide “legal means” to prevent improper use of geographical indications. 
Id. 
 280 See TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 23.1. 
 281 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
 282 Idaho for potato is an example of an American certification mark.  The mark is 
owned by the State of Idaho Potato Commission, U.S. Reg. No. 2914308.  The 
certification mark as used by authorized persons, certifies that goods identified by the 
mark are grown in Idaho and that goods conform to quality, grade and other 
requirements, pursuant to standards designated by the applicant. 
 283 See, e.g., Provisions for the Protection of Products of Geographical Indications, 
http://www.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a_no=2158&col_no=119&dir=200603 (last 
visited November 13, 2007). 
 284 SCAFIDI, supra note 86, at 153. 
 285 Id. 
AGDOMAR_121907_FINAL 12/19/2007  4:46:53 PM 
594 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
new administrative rules if necessary and the ongoing and 
uncertain costs of running any enforcement system. 
Under the current law there is scope for legal uncertainty, 
which can lead to increased litigation costs.286  If the proposals of 
the European Union for extension were granted, any administrative 
body would not need to consider whether or not the public was 
misled.287  It would be a straightforward objective288 inquiry 
similar to false advertising style protection for trademarks.  There 
would be no need to inquire into whether the public was misled or 
to examine evidence supporting claims for unfair competition.289  
Arguably, litigation costs would be reduced and administrative 
decisions would be uniform.290  What should matter are the long 
term economic effects and the guarantee of fair competition. 
In other areas of intellectual property the United States has 
adopted a more expansive approach to heightened protection for 
right holders.291  Professor Bruce Babcock points out that, “[t]he 
United States has been a forceful and consistent international 
advocate for increased protection of intellectual property rights.”292  
Babcock goes on to state that “[t]he fights against bootleg DVDs in 
China, production of unlicensed generic drugs in Africa, or the 
protection of the rights of seed companies have been led by the 
United States.”293  A further example is the implementation of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)294 which was 
adopted by Congress in order to comport with the requirements of 
 
 286 See Addor et al., supra note 24. 
 287 Id. at 5. 
 288 Id. at 5 (highlighting that “[u]nlike Article 22, Article 23 does not require evidence 
of the public being misled nor the proof of an act of unfair competition and thus would 
exclude the undesirable result  that different judges would come to diverging results with 
their discretionary tests”). 
 289 Id. at 5. 
 290 Id. at 5. 
 291 This is exemplified in the fight against bootleg DVD’s. See infra notes 292–293. 
 292 Bruce A. Babcock, Geographical Indications, Property Rights, and Value Added 
Agriculture, Review Paper (IAR 9:4:1-3), Nov. 2003, at 3, available at 
www.agmrc.org/NR/rdonlyres/76DO17B7-1520-4916-ABAC-8B4544AD5B81/0/ 
geographicalindications.pdf 
 293 Id. 
 294 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 implemented the United States 
ratification of the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and 
the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty. 
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the WIPO Internet Treaties.295  Rather than adopting a de minimis 
approach, the DMCA went far beyond the United States’ 
international treaty obligations.296  For example, the “WIPO 
Copyright Treaty297 requires countries to provide ‘adequate 
protection’ against circumvention of technical measures.”298  The 
United States raised the bar to catastrophic heights by outlawing 
acts of circumvention of access controls and technologies that have 
circumvention enabling devices.299  The scope of the provision is 
“overbroad and unclear, especially on the question whether it is 
legal to develop a technology necessary to engage in a privileged 
act of circumvention” such as fair use,300 which is entirely lawful 
under the Copyright Act.301  If the enactment of the DMCA was 
simply about harmonizing United States domestic legislation with 
its TRIPs obligations, Congress could simply have enacted 
legislation that made “it illegal to circumvent a technical protection 
system for purposes of engaging in or enabling copyright 
infringement.”302  The fact is that the copyright industries in the 
United States are thriving.303  As a major exporter of intellectual 
property the United States stands to make millions of dollars from 
this highly protectionist piece of legislation.  Congress has 
responded to criticisms concerning the breadth of the DMCA by 
arguing that the broader rules were adopted in part to set a standard 
that would help persuade other countries to pass similarly strong 
rules going forward.304  Thus, it is logical to conclude that the 
 
 295 The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty are collectively 
referred to as the “WIPO Internet Treaties.”  The Treaties are available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/ and http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/ 
wct_wppt/pdf/wct_wppt.pdf. 
 296 Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 519 (1999). 
 297 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, 2186 
U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter WCT]. 
 298 Samuelson, supra note 296, at 521; see also WCT, supra note 294, at 155. 
 299 Samuelson, supra note 296, at 521. 
 300 Id. at 519. 
 301 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (codifying the judicial doctrine of fair use). 
 302 Samuelson, supra note 296, at 533. 
 303 Id. at 532. 
 304 See House Subcommittee Holds Hearings on WIPO Treaty Bills, OSP Liability, 54 
BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 413, 413 (1997). 
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United States not only considers heightened protection for right 
holders intuitive, but that it wants to set an example for the rest of 
the world.  In light of this, Congress must be mindful that 
heightened protection for right holders must, to the extent that it is 
possible, benefit all of the WTO Member states.  This includes 
protection of non-traditional forms of intellectual property such as 
cultural products.  Meaningful participation in the development 
and enactment of a substantive international regime for heightened 
geographical indication protection would show a genuine 
commitment to the mandates of TRIPs.305 
The Old World Members bid for extension of the current 
geographical indication regime is an attempt to improve the 
protection of geographical indications in the future.306  It is an 
attempt to protect right holders against the continued pillaging of 
their cultural products.307  New World Members’ arguments that 
there might be prohibitive costs involved are not sufficient to 
prevent enhancement of the law in accordance with obligatory 
TRIPs mandates. 
F. Conflict Resolution? 
Opponents also argue that extension will cause a heightened 
risk of disputes between WTO Member states.308  This may well be 
the case, but this is true for many multilateral agreements.309  This 
adverse consequence is one “cost” of any form of intellectual 
property protection.  New World Members further argue that there 
will be an increased risk for conflict among regional producers.310  
 
 305 See, e.g., TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 13.  This Note renews the WTO Member States’ 
long term objective to establish a fair and market oriented trading system through a 
program of fundamental reform encompassing strengthened rules and specific 
commitments on support and protection in order to correct and prevent restrictions and 
distortions in world agricultural markets. Id.; see also TRIPs supra note 13, art. 16. 
 306 See Lynne Beresford, Geographical Indications: The Current Landscape, 17 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 979, 991–92 (2007). 
 307 See Addor et al., supra note 24 (pointing out that  “what matters are the long term 
effects and the guarantee of  sustainable and fair competition”). 
 308 See Rangnekar, supra note 23, at 3. 
 309 Id. 
 310 See id. at 3; see also Bhutani & Kothari, supra note 87, at 607 (discussing conflicts 
that may arise between countries due to the same biological resources existing in 
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For example, there are many regions in the “New” world that have 
an identical name to regions in the “Old” world.  Who decides who 
owns culture?  Why should the immigrant family who has moved 
from Greece and settled in a foreign land but follows the same 
procedure for making Feta cheese that their ancestors followed be 
denied the opportunity to name their cheese Feta?311  Concerns 
about the homonymous geographical indication are legitimate.  
Analogous dilemmas can be found in trademark law as is 
evidenced by the doctrine of concurrent use.  TRIPs Article 24.4 is 
one possible solution to this problem.  “The most famous example 
of continuous use is the case of Budweiser beer.  Since the 
thirteenth century the beer has been brewed in Budweis, Bohemia 
and named accordingly.”312  Since the nineteenth century, 
“Budweiser” has also been used to brand an American beer.  After 
“litigation in the United States, [the term ‘Budweiser’] was deemed 
to have ‘secondary meaning’ so that it could be registered as [an 
American] trademark.”313  Although “[t]he name is still fought 
over, TRIPS does not attempt to settle the matter and allows use in 
each of its member countries.”314  TRIPs Article 24.4 states: 
Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to 
prevent continued and similar use of a particular 
geographical indication of another Member 
identifying wines or spirits in connection with 
goods or services by any of its nationals or 
domiciliaries who have used that geographical 
indication in a continuous manner with regard to the 
same or related goods or services in the territory of 
 
different countries).  The article, citing Professor Madhav Gadgil, proposes one possible 
solution to such conflicts. Id. 
 311 See Amity Shlaes, Comment & Analysis, An Unpalatable Attitude Towards Food, 
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at 19.  The author argues that the European Union desire to 
spread geographical indication protection to the U.S. is culturally and economically 
protectionist.  The author goes on to state that “[t]he Brussels position reflects the dreamy 
presumption that European place names are Europe’s exclusive property, even when they 
are attached to a food.” Id. 
 312 Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the TRIPS 
Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 11, 43 (1996). 
 313 Id.; see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc., v. Budweiser Malt Prod. Corp., 295 F. 306, 309 
(2d Cir. 1923). 
 314 Conrad, supra note 312, at 43. 
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that Member either (a) for at least 10 years 
preceding 15 April 1994 or (b) in good faith 
preceding that date.315 
The problem of repatriating semi-generic names also arises 
within the European Union.  An example is the geographical 
indication “Feta” cheese.  In October 2005, the European Court of 
Justice ruled that the term “Feta” had not become generic.316  The 
result is that the use of “Feta” is restricted to producers in the 
designated region of Greece.317  The dispute began in 1996 when 
“Feta” was originally registered as a PDO under Regulation 
1107/96.318  In 1999, Germany and Denmark supported by France 
and the United Kingdom, successfully applied to the Court for 
cancellation of the registration on the ground that it had become a 
generic term for a soft, white cheese made from sheep or cow’s 
milk.  The Commission concluded that the name had not become 
generic.  Denmark and Germany appealed and argued that they had 
used the term “Feta” to label their cheese for over fifty years.  The 
European Court of Justice disagreed with Denmark and Germany 
and upheld the legality of the registration.  The court found “[t]he 
interplay between the . . . natural factors and the specific human 
factors, in particular the traditional production method, . . . has thus 
given ‘Feta’ cheese its remarkable international reputation.”319  
The result is that manufacturers of “Feta” cheese outside of the 
designated area are prohibited from referring to their product as 
“Feta” or “Feta-style” cheese. 
The case of Feta cheese shows that existing mechanisms can 
adequately address conflicts that arise from disputes concerning 
violations of geographical indications between WTO Member 
states.  Within the United States the same domestic and 
international procedures utilized to redress trademark and 
certification mark violations could be used to redress geographical 
 
 315 TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 24.4. 
 316 Joined Cases C-465 & C-466/02, F.R.G. v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. I-9115. 
 317 See id. 
 318 Id.; see Council Regulation 2081/92, On the Protection of Geographical Indications 
and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Art. 4, 1992 O.J. (L 
208) 1, 3; see also supra note 122. 
 319 Joined Cases, supra note 316. 
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indication violations.  The fact that there might be increased 
litigation must be balanced against the desire to have greater 
certainty and uniformity of the law.  Moreover, the increased 
mobility of consumers, the extensive reach of the media and the 
reduction of trading barriers dictates the development of global 
branding strategies.320  Without heightened international 
geographical indication protection right holders have little 
incentive to continue producing premium quality goods in this 
increasingly borderless trading economy. 
IV. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? 
Is the discussion concerning extension of geographical 
indications a mere quodlibet?  Or are there quantifiable benefits for 
the international community?  It is indisputable that in comparison 
with other TRIPs obligations, the implementation of geographical 
indication obligations has occurred in the most ad hoc manner.321  
This undermines the general objective of TRIPs which is to 
establish a predictable multilateral system of rules and disciplines 
protecting intellectual property rights and the desire to promote 
effective and adequate protection.322  Additionally, the following 
arguments can be made; First, there is no empirical evidence to 
support claims that developing countries will necessarily benefit 
under enhanced regulation.  Even if they do receive some benefit 
the costs of administration might be far too high.  Others argue that 
market forces change cultures of production despite protection 
from geographical indications even when methods are regulated.323  
Winemaking is a classic example.  In many regions of France 
innovation and economics have led to the adoption of new 
techniques and practices at the expense of prior traditions.  In some 
cases producers forego the geographical indication they are legally 
entitled to in order to pursue new production methods.  “This 
happened in Tuscany, where wine innovators . . . abandoned the 
Chianti Classico Denominazione d’Origine Controllata e Garantita 
 
 320 See Miller, supra note 174, at B1. 
 321 Beijing Symposium, supra note 69, at 5. 
 322 Id. 
 323 Broude, supra note 166, at 678. 
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(“DOCG”), preferring to introduce non-Tuscan grape varieties 
such as Cabernet Sauvignon into the blends that made up some of 
their best wines . . . .”324  On the one hand, the example of Chianti 
might be a case of quod erat demonstrandum and thus, one can 
conclude that geographical indications are not effective as the 
guardians of cultural preservation.  On the other hand, the example 
of Chianti could reflect that geographical indications are no 
different from other forms of intellectual property protection; 
trademarks can be abandoned or lost due to naked licensing.  The 
practical effect is that another producer is free to come along and 
use the geographical indication.  Thus, some of the concerns of 
New World Members are allayed and the juggernaut free market 
economy can march on. 
Even if all of the legitimate reasons for extension are rejected 
and this is truly a case of European Union protectionism, how is 
this different from the United States’ implementation of the 
DMCA?  There is nothing inherently inimical in the United States 
legislating to benefit its right holders.  Rather it is evidence that 
each WTO member nation will to some degree inevitably seek to 
formulate international intellectual property standards that benefit 
their own nationals.  The true task for the United States and the 
European Union is to ensure that developing nations and domestic 
niche producers are able to protect the intellectual property that is 
necessary for their economic and cultural survival. 
Furthermore, producers in the United States could benefit from 
enhanced protection of geographical indications.325  Examples of 
geographical indications in the United States are Idaho potatoes, 
Vidalia onions and Florida oranges.  There are increasing numbers 
of producers in the agricultural sector who recognize the benefits 
of enhanced geographical indication protection.  United States 
producers also want to access worldwide consumer demand.  An 
 
 324 Id. at 665. 
 325 See Babcock & Clemens, supra note 45, at 13.  Professor Babcock notes that there 
are numerous examples of how increased protection for cultural goods has led to 
increased profits for producers in Europe.  Italian “‘Toscano’ oil receives a twenty 
percent premium over commodity oil” since the company registered its brand name in 
1998.  “[T]he market price for Breese poultry in France is quadruple that of commodity 
poultry meat[,] . . . milk used to produce French Comte cheese sells for a 10 percent 
premium . . . .” Id. at 13. 
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example of the benefits for United States producers can be found 
in the case of Copper River Salmon.326 
“Copper River Salmon Cordova” is a trademark 
held by a corporation. . . .  [T]he current trademark 
could be sold to another entity so that the salmon 
being produced would not necessarily originate 
from Copper River.  Further, producers in other 
countries could be allowed to market any salmon as 
Copper River Salmon Cordova.  Finally, if the 
corporation does not include all producers and 
processors in the decision-making process and does 
not spread any economic rewards throughout the 
supply chain, it will be more difficult to obtain 
complete buy-in by all participants to protect 
product quality and integrity and to pool resources 
to market the salmon.327 
Another factor to consider is the increasing pressure the United 
States and the European Union are facing to cut agricultural 
subsidies given to farmers.328  Farmer subsidies overwhelmingly 
focus on commodities, which results in producers focusing their 
energies on identifying ways to produce cheaper goods in mass 
quantities.329  If producers are given an incentive to produce 
premium quality products by bestowing property rights over the 
names of regional products, thereby generating a higher profit for 
 
 326 Id. at 16. 
 327 Id. 
 328 See Carter Dougherty, Once Again, Trade Effort Stumbles on Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 22, 2007, at C3.  At the Potsdam Ministerial Conference the United States offered to 
enact a $17 billion ceiling for agricultural subsidies, much lower than the $22 billion 
initially proposed.  The European Union also proposed plans to cut agricultural subsidies. 
Id. 
 329 See Roxanne Clemens and Bruce A. Babcock, Country of Origin as a Brand: The 
Case of New Zealand Lamb, MATRIC Briefing Paper 04-MBP 9 (Nov. 2004), at 2–3, 
available at http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/04mbp9.pdf (“A 
major driver in developing an internationally competitive industry [for New Zealand 
lamb] was the removal of government subsidies 20 years ago.  Prior to 1984, a series of 
government programs using various systems of price supports, market intervention, and 
low interest loans was implemented to stabilize and support the industry . . . .  [The] loss 
of government support was a turning point in changing producer dependence on subsidy-
driven, volume based production to an industry structure that emphasized production 
efficiencies and product quality.”). 
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their goods, the need for subsidies will decline.  Moreover, in light 
of the protracted and foundering Doha negotiations,330 absent some 
shift in the status quo, it is reasonable to conjecture that “the big 
emerging economies will have to file formal complaints at the 
WTO’s dispute-settlement tribunal to force rich countries to lower 
their farm subsidies.”331  It is also fair to conclude that “Doha’s 
demise would almost certainly spell a surge in WTO litigation, 
putting the multilateral system under enormous strain.”332  “If 
many judgments go against America, Congress would surely 
question the WTO’s legitimacy.”333  This would be bad as one of 
the aims of TRIPS was to establish a “mutually supportive 
relationship” between the activities of the WTO and the 
development of international intellectual property legislation.334 
Reaching some consensus on the geographical indication 
debate is one way to bring a degree of equilibrium to the current 
situation.  Emerging economies may never get the United States to 
reduce its farmer subsidies to what they consider to be an 
acceptable level.335  Neither can they be certain that the European 
Union will be willing to open its agricultural markets to the extent 
they deem to be appropriate.336  However, with adequate protection 
of their cultural products these economies can start to reap some of 
the economic benefits from multilateralism.  Producers like the 
basmati rice farmers in India can market their cultural goods absent 
unfair competition from highly subsidized counterfeit products. 
Moreover, despite the United States’ opposition to enhanced 
geographical indication protection on an international level it is 
party to several bilateral trade agreements that afford enhanced 
 
 330 See generally Potsdam, supra note 26; Mangling Trade, supra note 56. 
 331 Potsdam, supra note 26. 
 332 Id. 
 333 Id. 
 334 TRIPs, supra note 13; TRIPS preamble, supra note 15.  The preamble to the TRIPs 
Agreement states that one of the goals of the treaty is “to establish a mutually supportive 
relationship between the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization as well 
as other relevant international organizations.” Id. 
 335 See ICTSD DOHA UPDATE, supra note 54, at 15 (discussing the gridlock between the 
WTO Members relating to agriculture and trade reforms). See id. at 19 for a more in-
depth discussion about the lack of consensus between the WTO Members concerning 
geographical indication protection. 
 336 Id. at 15. 
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protection to specific goods.  For example, the Bourbon-Cognac 
Accord is a bilateral agreement signed between the United States 
and France.337  The Accord requires the United States to “reserve 
the use . . . of the name [ ] ‘Cognac’ . . . to the French products 
entitled by virtue of existing French legislation to use [that] 
name . . . .”338  Cognac indicates a brandy that meets certain 
prescribed standards of quality and content and that is produced in 
the Cognac region of France under conditions regulated by French 
law.339  Mexico also received explicit protection for Tequila and 
Mezcal in the North American Free Trade Agreement.340  In the 
recent United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement there was a 
commitment that Bourbon whiskey and Tennessee whiskey would 
be protected geographical indications in Australia.341  There is no 
indication that bilateral trade and intellectual property agreements 
are in decline.342  Protection for geographical indications should 
certainly not take place through the patchwork of bilateralism.  
This is imperative as “developing countries still occupy weak 
bargaining positions vis-à-vis their more powerful trading 
partners.”343  One of the main goals of the TRIPs Agreement is to 
create a competitive trading ground for all WTO Members with the 
commitment to preventing the marginalization of the least 
 
 337 See Agreement Providing for the Recognition and Protection by France of the 
Appellation of Origin of United States Bourbon Whiskey and Continued Protection by 
the United States of Appellations of Origin of the French Brandies Cognac, Armagnac, 
and Calvados, U.S.-Fr., Dec. 2, 1970–Jan. 18, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 673 [hereinafter Bourbon-
Cognac Accord]. 
 338 Institut National Des Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1875, 1877 (T.T.A.B. 1998). 
 339 See Bourbon-Cognac Accord, supra note 337; see also Brown-Forman, 47 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1884–85 (holding the term Cognac was not a generic name and was a valid 
common law certification mark). 
 340 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Annex 313 ¶ 3, Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 341 Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 2004 U.S.T. LEXIS 162. 
 342 Roffe & Vivas-Eugui, supra note 168, at 15 (“Since the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations and the adoption of the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the US has pursued new and expanded 
commitments in the area of intellectual property (IP) with a number of its trade partners.  
As of 1994, the US has sought such provisions in more than 15 free trade agreements 
(FTAs) containing standards that go beyond the requirements of the TRIPS 
Agreement.”). 
 343 Id. at 16; see also Wolf, supra note 79, at 19. 
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developed countries.344  If the trend is increased harmonization and 
the trend is higher protection for global intellectual property rights 
then extension of the current geographical indication regime is 
intuitive. 
Additionally, there is no doubt that the current law under 
TRIPs provides for legal uncertainty.  For example, McCarthy has 
asked: “What should happen when a recently established 
[geographical indication] conflicts with an established 
trademark?”345  In the United States, both trademarks and 
geographical indications fall within the purview of common law 
and registered trademarks.346  Consequently, any “conflicts that 
might arise are resolved using the familiar concepts of priority and 
likelihood of confusion.”347  In Europe, protection for geographical 
indications is sui generis so there are potentially “several possible 
rules of priority.”348  “Under the rule of ‘first-in-time, first-in-
right,’ the prior trademark would take precedence over the later 
established [geographical indication].  Or, [they] could be allowed 
to co-exist . . . [o]r, the [geographical indication] would take 
precedence and the conflicting trademark rights would be 
voided.”349 
 
 344 See TRIPs, supra note 13; TRIPs preamble, supra note 15. 
 345 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 236, § 14:1.50. 
 346 Id. 
 347 Id. 
 348 Id. 
 349 Id. 
For example, assume that the geographical name EVIAN were to be 
registered and protected as a [geographical indication].  Applying this 
rule, the [geographical indication] would destroy the existing 
trademark rights in EVIAN.  See U.S. Reg. 1155024 (registering 
EVIAN for mineral water).  Perhaps because of similar conflicts, in 
April, 2003, the EU amended regulation 2081/92 to exclude mineral 
and spring waters from the scope of goods eligible for [geographical 
indication] protection. 
Id. n.28; see also Council Regulation 692/2003, art. 2, 2003 O.J. (L 99); Beijing 
Symposium, supra note 69, at 3 (pointing out that “In some countries GI producers are 
confronted with registered trademarks which contain their GI names).  According to the 
principle of ‘first in time, first in right’ applicable to trademarks, it is therefore not 
possible for producers to seek trademark registration of their name as it is already legally 
owned by another private party.  In such cases GI producers only have two options.  They 
can launch proceedings to obtain cancellation of the registered trademark or they can 
enter into negotiations with the owner of the trademark in order to buy it.  In both cases, 
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Finally, even if extension is a disguise for European trade 
protectionism, developing countries must seize this opportunity to 
gain an equal footing on the international intellectual property 
platform.  This debate must not gravitate around United States and 
European Union agriculture and trade policy.350  The proclivity of 
the richer nations to craft legislation to their benefit will not 
decline absent a real commitment to the mandates of TRIPs.351  It 
is simply “inappropriate for the largest and richest countries to be 
demanding a quid pro quo” in the realm of heightened international 
intellectual property protection from the poorest and least 
developed countries in the world.352 
Geographical indications are an opportunity for emerging 
economies to use intellectual property rules to improve their living 
standards by generating wealth for their communities, preserving 
their cultural heritage and landscape.  For example, in 1999, the 
Indian Parliament passed the Geographical Indications of Goods 
(Registration and Protection) Act.353  The Act seeks to provide for 
the registration and better protection of geographical indications 
for goods relating to India.  The Parliament recognized that 
providing legal protection for Indian geographical indications 
would boost exports and promote economic prosperity for 
 
actions launched by GI producers have proven to be very costly and are not always 
successful.”). 
 350 See Beattie & Callan, supra note 60, at 12. 
 351 For example, five years after the adoption of the DMD, the United States and the 
European Union have engaged in a tsunami wave of bilateral treaties negotiating TRIPs-
plus intellectual property rules, weakening or eliminating the public safeguards under 
TRIPs and delaying the availability of affordable generic medications.  An example can 
be found with the current dispute concerning Novartis.  Novartis is currently challenging 
an Indian patent law that “blocks patenting of minor improvements in known molecules.  
India is a vital source of cheap generic medicines” in poorer countries.  If the Novartis 
challenge succeeds many people “in the developing world could lose access to vital 
drugs.”  The “[h]umanitarian agency Mèdecins San Frontières has said that tens of 
thousands of people being treated for AIDS will suffer if the Swiss company succeeds in 
changing India’s patent law.” Reuters, India Court Reserves Order in Novartis Patent 
Case, Apr. 4, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/DEL201668.htm. 
 352 See Charlton & Stiglitz, supra note 34, at 19. 
 353 The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, No. 48 of 
1999, India Code, available at http://indiacode.nic.in [hereinafter GI Goods Act]. 
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producers of goods produced in an economic territory.354  Under 
the Act, registration is not compulsory and protection is for a 
period of ten years.355  If registration for a geographical indication 
is not renewed then it is liable to be removed from the register.356  
The Act is comprehensive and thorough and could be used a model 
for developing countries in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the debate concerning extension of the 
framework for international geographical indications is far from 
over.  The very nature of the geographical indication involves two 
components: a) the regional connection; and b) the cultural 
component.  It is not culture or a process alone that explains the 
geographical indication but the combination of culture and locus.  
Determining which side of the debate one falls on will depend very 
much upon the value placed upon this symbiotic relationship.  
Advances in technology, lower transportation costs and the 
reduction of trade barriers have led to the mass production of 
standardized products.  Cultural homogeneity abounds.  Extended 
protection for geographical indications has the potential to serve 
many purposes: a) protection for producers and source 
communities; b) protection for consumers; and c) increased quality 
and production standards.  However, there are many wrinkles that 
must be ironed out before any extension of the current international 
geographical indication regime is memorialized. 
Moreover, developing nations such as India have had to adapt 
to fast-paced intellectual property harmonization, despite their 
economic and structural disadvantages, in order to comply with 
TRIPs.357  Domestic laws have been enacted against the interests 
of the local inhabitants in the name of harmonization.358  Equally, 
 
 354 Focus on Geographical Indications at Meet, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 23, 2002, available 
at 2002 WLNR 7364857. 
 355 GI Goods Act, supra note 353, para. 18.1. 
 356 Id. para. 18.4. 
 357 See YAMIN, supra note 62, at 46–48. 
 358 For example, one of the major critiques raised against FTAs has been that they 
impinge upon the flexibilities established in the TRIPs Agreement.  These FTAs usually 
include comprehensive chapters on intellectual property that go well beyond the TRIPs 
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the United States must be prepared to adapt its domestic laws to 
comply with TRIPs especially where the goals of the domestic 
legislation mirror closely those of the proposed international 
legislation.  Professor Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate, argues that a 
legitimate development agenda must recognize that developing 
countries are deserving of differential treatment.359  He points out 
that this will “entail a movement away from principles of 
reciprocity and bargaining” and a movement towards “unilateral 
concessions by the developed countries.”360  Failure to do so calls 
into question the legitimacy of TRIPs and tarnishes heightened 
global intellectual property protection for right holders.  If 
 
Agreement.  These so-called TRIPs plus provisions question the flexibilities and 
exceptions safeguarding public health interests.  One major area where the negative effect 
of the conclusion of FTAs is clear is the supply of pharmaceutical products.  For 
example, the US-Peru FTA has come under increased scrutiny due its data exclusivity 
provision.  This provision requires: 
[t]he exclusive protection of data for at least five years . . . .  [It] 
relates mainly to the regulatory hurdles that generic competitors must 
overcome before their pharmaceutical products reach the market.  
More specifically, the protection of test data prevents producers of 
generic drugs from relying on information provided by the person 
that submitted the original data to sanitary authorities. 
This provision has recently been amended to a “reasonable period of time.” Roffe supra 
note 168, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also European Parliament TRIPS  
Amendment Postponed Once Again, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST (Int’l Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-09-
19/story4.htm (discussing a “controversial amendment to WTO intellectual property rules 
aimed at easing poor countries’ access to patented drugs”).  At the moment there is a 
temporary “waiver setting out the conditions under which it would be legal for Members 
to issue compulsory licenses for the production and export of cheap generic copies of 
patented medicines [sic] to poor countries unable to manufacture drugs.” Id.  “WTO 
Members agreed to [make] the TRIPS amendment [permanent] in late 2005.  Only nine 
countries have ratified it so far . . . .” Id.; Kenyan Parliament Rejects Patent Law 
Amendments, Preserves TRIPS Flexibilities, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST 
(Int’l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), Sept. 19, 2007, 
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-09-19/story3.htm (noting that “[a]ccording to the United 
Nations, 1.3 million people are living with HIV/AIDS in Kenya[ ]” and quoting Ellen 
t’Hoen of Mèdecins San Frontières, “our ability to provide AIDS medicines to over 
10,000 people in Kenya depends on the availability of affordable generic medicines . . . 
[which] would have been in jeopardy if the amendments had gone through”) (brackets in 
the original). 
 359 Wolf, supra note 79. 
 360 Id. 
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intellectual property is an item of global trade,361 which according 
to TRIPs it is, then effective globalization demands that the owners 
of cultural goods be guaranteed a predictable level of protection for 
their goods. 
Incidents such as the Neem tree saga reflect the dangers of 
failure to protect cultural products.  The goal is not to prevent 
development but rather to ensure that at the very least right holders 
are compensated for what has been deemed intellectual property by 
all TRIPs signatories.  The Wine Agreement is a step in the right 
direction but the United States must take greater strides towards 
developing a globally accepted substantive regime governing 
protection of geographical indications to be compliant with the 
TRIPs acquis. 
The debate must now shift focus from whether or not extension 
is beneficial to what form it should take.  For example, decisions 
must be made as to the form of the multilateral and national 
registers, the consequences of registration, the duration and 
renewals of registrations and the modifications and withdrawals of 
notification and registrations and the fees and costs.  Conceding 
that New World Members are satisfied with the status quo, if any 
progress is to be made the demandeurs must be prepared to take 
the lead and push for greater comity to balance the forces of 
globalization. 
 
 361 See Long, supra note 64, at 240 (discussing intellectual property as a utilitarian 
object of trade). 
